_Journal of World-Systems Research_
                   Volume 1, Number 13, 1995
                      http://jwsr.ucr.edu/

                        ISSN 1076-156X

         Germany, The United States and Future Core Conflict


                       Brigitte Schulz
                      Political Science
                       Trinity College
                   Hartford, CT. 06106 USA
                brigette.schulz@mail.trincoll.edu

               Copyright (c) 1995 Brigitte Schulz


[Page 1]


I. Introduction

     With the end of the Cold War, much attention has 
been paid to the nature of the emerging new world order. 
By what criteria will power and influence be measured in
this new era? Who will be the winners and losers? What
types of alliances will develop? Or is Francis
Fukuyama's argument correct that, with the collapse of
communism, we have reached the "...end point of
mankind's ideological evolution" and thus "the end of
history" [1]. Unlike Marx, who saw socialism as the end
of humanity's arduous journey, Fukuyama tells us that
the search is off because we have already arrived at
our evolutionary destination: liberal capitalism. 
     Other analysts envision less optimistic scenarios.
Common to these views is an understanding of capitalism
that stresses its more competitive nature, and thus its
inherent tendency towards conflict. This inherent
antagonism between the major industrial powers, which
in the old Marxist literature used to be referred to as
"inter-imperialist rivalry," appears to have been
renamed "geo-economics" by many contemporary observers
[2]. There seems to be broad agreement that economic

[Page 2]

rivalry is the driving force of future conflict, rather
than the "high politics" of security. In fact, now that
Marxism has been declared dead, economic questions have
entered center stage in scholarly works on the global
competition for power and wealth.
     One of the most popular scenarios to have emerged
over the past few years has been to anticipate growing
tensions between the three main core powers: the US,
Germany, and Japan [3]. In this conception, the world
is about to fall into three competing (neo-Orwellian?)
economic blocs, with each of the three main powers
using their immediate geographic areas to build its own
regional empire. While a scenario which anticipates
growing tensions within the core is entirely plausible,
there is little doubt that the US will continue to be
the dominant power in the new world order, especially
in the military/strategic areas. This dominance
will not translate into a position of hegemony,
however, and we will argue below that inter-core
tensions will lead to a strategic alliance between the
two main Western core powers, the United States and
Germany [4].
     As has been often noted, Germany at the turn of

[Page 3]

the millennium is destined to play a pivotal role in
the new world order. After unification, it boasts one
of the largest populations of any of the world's nation
states, in addition to being one of the economic
powerhouses within the victorious world of liberal
capitalism. Yet, tugging at the tails of German
ambitions are memories of a past which is unsuitable
for great power ambitions, at least in the foreseeable
future [5].
     The first task of this paper, then, is to look at
Germany within the context of the radically altered
post-Cold War world. What precisely is happening in
Europe's most powerful state? Has one of the
consequences of unification been a resurgence in German
nationalism and expansionist ambitions? Is there a
chance, in fact, that Germany will seek to become a new
global hegemon? Is this even a possibility?
     We argue that Germany, based on a multitude of
factors which will be outlined below, is not now, nor
will it become at any time in the foreseeable future,
a global hegemon. This is not to argue, however, that
Germany does not have an increasingly ambitious foreign
policy agenda, nor that it will not become a key player
in global politics. Indeed, as will be asserted in the

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second part of this paper, Germany will enter into a
close alliance with the United States to form a
reinvigorated trans-Atlantic marriage in which the
common bonds of "culture and civilization" will replace
a virulent anti-communism as the common vow.
     A key question which this second part of the paper
will address is the extent to which contours of this
new alliance and the enemy images used to cement it are
already visible. As will be argued, many of its
features are not new but were half forgotten during the
conflict with communism. In the decades to come, the
"East" will again define the "others," the enemies
against whom Western states must be on guard and
protect themselves. In this coming conflict, however,
the "red menace" will be replaced by the "yellow
peril," itself a notion which is not new in the
historiography of the West [6]. As stated in The
Economist, the success of East Asia seems to present "a
challenge to the West that is in some way stronger (if
less antagonistic) than that of communism" [7].
     Before addressing these issues in detail, however,
we will turn to a brief discussion of the domestic and
international context in which to place unified
Germany.

[Page 5]

II. Germany since Unification

a) Problems with Unification

     On October 3rd, 1990 the former German Democratic
Republic was formally incorporated into the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) under Article 23 of the
latter's constitution. On that day the GDR simply
ceased to exist, and the entire West German political,
economic, legal, and social apparatus was imposed on
the Eastern part of the country as though it were a
tabula rasa. This had been preceded on July 1 by the
introduction of the West German deutsche mark in the
East, at a rate which was politically determined by
Chancellor Kohl's government but which had disastrous
consequences for the East German economy. 
     Between 1989 and 1992, east German exports to
former Comecon countries fell by more than 75% from
almost DM 29bn to DM 7 bn. During same period, West
German firms were able to increase their exports by 23%
(DM 24.4 bn to DM 30.1 bn) [8]. Economic developments
after 1990 led to an unprecedented level of
deindustrialization in the former GDR. For example, in
the Halle/Leipzig/Bitterfeld region, in which over

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100,000 workers were employed by the chemical industry
during GDR days, more than two-thirds have lost their
jobs [9]. By spring 1994, counting unemployment (1.26
mn), government job creation (238,000) or retraining
(249,000) programs, as well as early retirement schemes
(205,000), 37% of the entire East German working
population was without regular employment [10]. Two
Harvard economists, Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-
Martin, have estimated that it will take fifty years
before the economic gap between East and West Germany
is closed [11]. Lothar Sp„t, general manager of
Jenoptik GmbH and former minister president of the West
German state of Baden-W�rttemberg, thinks it will take
10-15 years before self-sustaining growth in the East
will take place [12].
     Industrial production in the former GDR amounts to
only 4% of total German production, while 20% of the
German population lives there. Export levels provide a
good indicator for the precipitous fall of production
in eastern Germany: Overall exports fell from DM 41.1
billion in 1989 (the last year the GDR existed) to DM
17.5 billion in 1991 and roughly 12 billion in 1993
[13].
     For east Germans, another aspect of unification

[Page 7]

has been that everything learned in the past has been
rendered obsolete, and indeed the negation of how
properly to do anything. Civil servants from the old
FRG were dispatched to teach east Germans the "proper"
way [14]. Just about all supervisory and managerial
positions in the government bureaucracy in the east
were held by people from the western part of the
country, totalling 35,000 high level civil servant
"migrants" by 1993 [15].  The same was true for most
top positions in research and academic institutions.
Since leading positions had previously belonged to
loyal members of the SED, a massive purge took place
after unification to "purify" the country of
ideological undesirables.  Their replacements were
generally chosen in the West. The GDR's print and
electronic media were likewise either simply taken over
by West German enterprises or closed down.
     Even "privatization," that alleged magical
solution to postcommunist woes, has created among East
Germans the sense of being deprived of the just fruits
of their past labor. While in most other Eastern
(Central?) European countries individual citizens have
at least gotten the legal right to purchase or to
receive on a grant basis stock in former "people's

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owned enterprises," the east German economy was sold to
the highest bidders through a special institution, the
Treuhandanstalt in Berlin. Although founded under the
Modrow Communist caretaker government on March 1, 1990,
and assigned the task of overseeing the transition from
a centrally planned to a market economy, to East
Germans the Treuhandanstalt has become the symbol of
Western domination over the old GDR. Charged with
selling off 32,400 enterprises in the former GDR, from
restaurants to corner grocery stores to gargantuan
chemical plants, Treuhand automatically became an
institution of the Bonn government after unification.
Obviously Western investors bought the most profitable
east German plants first, leaving Treuhand with all
those firms unable to compete in a free market
environment. Treuhand AG still owned 850 enterprises by
the spring of 1994 [16]. Treuhand's first president,
Detlef Karsten Rohwedder (assassinated in 1991)
confidently predicted that Treuhand would make "around
DM 600 billion" selling off East Germany's "people's
enterprises"; instead, it accumulated about DM 275 in
debt. East German criticisms of Treuhand abound,
including that it brought about deindustrialization in
the east, it engaged in many sleazy deals [17], and it

[Page 9]

caused the layoff of millions [18].
     In April 1994, the polling institute
Infratest/Burke found that 65% of all east Germans
think the overall economic situation is bad, and
another 14% that it is very bad. Only 55% look to the
future with optimism (1991 = 70%), while pessimists now
make up 35%. Only one in four thinks that developments
in the East are heading "in the right direction", 28%
are no longer sure, and 47% think post-unification
economic development gone in the wrong direction [19].
According to Forsa, another polling institute, an
overwhelming number of Germans in both the East and the
West now feel that privatization has gone too quickly,
and over two thirds think that the Treuhand did not do
a good job.[20] The agency officially closed its doors
on December 31, 1994.
     At one of his regular meetings with
representatives from industry and trade unions in July
1994, Chancellor Kohl pointed out that more than DM 500
billion will have been invested in the eastern part of
the country by the end of the year. On a per capita
basis, the Chancellor argued, this amounts to three
times the amount invested in the FRG after the
establishment of the DM in 1948 and before the

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"economic miracle" began a decade later [21]. The Bonn
government has transferred a net amount of DM 130
billion annually to the East in order to facilitate
economic development. What the Chancellor did not point
out, however, is that East Germany imports DM 255
billion worth of goods annually from the West, mainly
from West Germany. What this amounts to, then, is a
massive transfer of public funds from the Bonn
government to West German industry via a formal
transfer to the eastern part of the country, where
people use this money to purchase consumer goods made
in the western part of the country [22]. In addition,
many private investments in the East are in highly
capital intensive sectors such as chemicals or
automobiles, using state-of-the-art technology. This
does not bode well for an improvement in the employment
situation in any foreseeable future [23].

b. The Standort Deutschland Debate

     German unification coincided with the largest
crisis in the world capitalist economy since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. This crisis had both a
structural and a cyclical dimension, as adjustments in

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production and exchange brought about by the third
industrial revolution and one of capitalism's periodic
downturns coincided. In Germany, the cyclical downturn
was mitigated by the artificial rise in demand brought
about by unification with the East in 1990. Just as in
other advanced capitalist societies, however, the
effects of accelerating technological advancements and
intensifying globalization of production have led to a
"competitiveness" debate in Germany over the past few
years.
     The conservative government coalition's
explanation of the structural crisis of the German
economy is simple enough: Germans have become spoiled
by high wages, long vacations, and cradle-to-grave
social security. The answer? More market, more
individual initiative, more flexibility in hiring and
firing, and liberalization of job protection laws. On
the other hand, lower wages, fewer benefits, less
government, lower public debts, social security only
for the needy; i.e., lean production and lean
government [24]. These sentiments are largely echoed by
German industry, which insists that Germany's
international competitiveness is being threatened by
the country's high wage and benefit structure [25]. 

[Page 12]

     The country's trade unions disagree, pointing to
the fact that Germany's unemployment rate is low by
international standards and that the country alternates
with the United States as the world's largest exporting
nation, although its economy is only one third that of
the US [26]. The unions argue that the statistics used
by both government and industry are skewed by dramatic
changes in exchange rates. Between 1985 and 1992, for
example, the US dollar appreciated by 72.3% vis-…-vis
the DM, and 24.5% vis-…-vis all OECD countries. Thus
any presumed losses in global competitiveness are due
to factors to be found in the global economy, not in
Germany as a location of production [27].
     Both government and industry point out that the
end of the Cold War has permanently affected the
employment and investment situation in Germany by
removing the Iron Curtain. This has meant a large
number of highly skilled workers in the former
communist countries stand ready to work for
considerably lower wages. The effect of radically
different wage structures in Central and Eastern Europe
and within Germany is two-fold: It will encourage
German foreign direct investments in the East, while
also serving as a magnet for migrant laborers to the

[Page 13]

West. According to a German economics think tank, the
DIW, even if post-communist economic transformations
work smoothly, roughly 2.7 million will migrate West by
the year 2,000, with another 1.9 million by 2,010.
Should promises of rapid economic development fail to
materialize, the DIW estimates that the number of East-
West migrants will increase to 3.9 million by 2,000 and
another 2.6 million by 2,010 [28]. A survey conducted
by Eurobarometer in 18 post-communist societies in the
former Soviet bloc essentially confirms the DIW
assertion: About 2.7 million (1.2% of the total
population) say that they are definite about migrating
West, while 16.7 million (7.3%) say that they will
"definitely" or "probably" do so [29].
     Conversely, according to a survey conducted by the
German Chamber of Commerce in the Fall of 1993, 30% of
all German companies planned a relocate production
abroad, compared to 24% in the preceding years. This
normally does not mean closing entire plants in Germany
but instead amounts to a "creeping" relocation,
initially involving only parts of the production
process. In recent years about 70,000 jobs a year have
been created abroad through German FDIs. In the next
three years, planned foreign investments will lead to

[Page 14]

the creation of roughly 250,000 jobs abroad.
     The motives mentioned most often are disadvantages
in producing in Germany, especially in terms of costs
(high wages, benefit payments, taxes) plus
environmental legislation. Central and Eastern European
locations have advantages in low wages and close
proximity to Germany (especially the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary), as well as highly trained and
motivated workforces. Companies are also aware that one
of their advantages is the "Made in Germany" label,
however, which leads to a certain reluctance to
relocate production entirely abroad.
     The countries of Central Europe are in first place
as the destination of choice within next three years,
followed by Asian countries, which in the past enjoyed
advantages based on low wages. Now Southeast Asian
countries are mainly of interest for realizing future
market shares of the little tigers plus China and
Japan. Of little surprise is the fact that companies in
labor-intensive industries, such as textiles plants,
plan to relocate most often [30]. The prestigious
Institut f�r Weltwirtschaft in Kiel has suggested that
Germany's borders with low-wage Central European
countries will create a "European version of the

[Page 15]

Maquiladoras;" i.e., a border economy like the one on
the Mexican-US border [31].
     Even Japan, long considered immune to these types
of adjustment pressures, now finds itself in the twin
throes of its worst recession since the Second World
War and the competitive pressure of low-wage
neighboring countries [32]. A study of 1,615 domestic
Japanese companies showed that the manufacturing
industry will dramatically increase foreign investments
over the coming year, mainly to low wage Asian
countries [33]. The Japanese government, like its
German counterpart, appears to be following an approach
of urging its workforce to make concessions while
simultaneously facilitating the movement of capital to
neighboring regions [34].
     German industry and government are thus obviously
not alone in telling its populations that they need to
work more for less. What has become a "competitiveness
debate" of sorts in the United States [35] also very
much informs discourse in Germany, as its political and
economic elite look for ways to keep the country firmly
within the core of the core [36]. The main problems
which are blamed for Germany's supposed lack of
international competitiveness are the country's

[Page 16]

structure of high wages and social security benefits,
making overall compensation packages the highest in the
world [37].
     The end of communism has made this process of
labor cost reduction easier, as there is no competing
system claiming to represent an alternative to the
exploitation and economic insecurity which capitalism
holds for the average worker. The mere "existence" of
communism had always made necessary at least some
concessions by capital to labor.  While over the past
seven decades workers in the West were told that they
could enjoy political freedom and economic and social
security simultaneously, with the end of communism they
are now told to be "realistic," not simultaneously to
expect political freedom and a high standard of living!

c. The Search for Identity

     Unified Germany continues to be badly divided, not
only economically but also psychologically [38]. People
in the post-communist East feel let down by the many
promises not kept over the past five years and the
communist successor party, the PDS (Party of Democratic
Socialism), is now the third strongest political party

[Page 17]

there [39]. In the west, on the other hand, there is a
strong feeling that eastern Germans are unthankful for
all of the help they have gotten and that the years of
living under communism have made them look to the state
for too many handouts [40].
     The situation is further complicated by the fact
that Germans on both sides of the former Iron Curtain
have no clear sense of what it means to be German.
Unified Germany has no fixed vision of itself as a
nation, no symbol or historical event, no matter how
distorted or mystified, that can unite the population
behind it [41]. It has become clear in the years since
reunification that the "German Question" is much more
complex than it seemed during the time of the country's
division, where the sole emphasis was placed on the
fact that the German people had been separated against
their will [42].
     After the bitter experiences of the Hitler era,
West Germans found pride in their economic achievements
("DM nationalism") while East Germans kept themselves
going by yearning to be united with the western part of
the country again. Now that unification is here and the
country is caught in a deep structural economic crisis,
Germans on both sides have no clear guideposts on how

[Page 18]

to proceed, what to believe in, or what precisely it is
that binds them together [43].
     The Kohl government has sought to provide part of
a solution by becoming more explicitly nationalistic in
its rhetoric. For example, the Chancellor ended his
1994 New Year's speech with the statement, "God bless
our German fatherland," something that would have been
quite unthinkable only a few years ago. In fact, it is
the significant shift to the right of the ruling
CDU/CSU which contributed greatly to the poor showing
of the country's extreme right parties in the October
1994 federal election. These parties's main political
appeal has been their attack on the huge influx of
foreigners, their insistence on a return to "family
values," as well as their insistence that German
interests should become the primary focus of Germany's
foreign policy objectives [44]. The fact that the
mainstream conservative parties have picked up these
themes to a significant extent has taken much of the
wind out of the electoral sails of these far right
parties.

[Page 19]

d. Xenophobia and Asylum Seekers

     As Germans are searching for a new identity, the
country is reminded of its rather unsavory past almost
daily as mainly young men assault foreigners on streets
and set fires to the homes of asylum seekers and so-
called "guest workers." What is perhaps most depressing
about these attacks is that most of these perpetrators
either work or are in school and come from rather
"normal" German families. According to Amnesty
International, there is a growing climate of
intolerance toward foreigners, particularly dark-
skinned peoples, with the police often failing to
protect the victims of racist attacks and sometimes
even mistreating foreigners and asylum seekers
themselves [45]. While most of the foreigners arriving
in Germany in search of a better life come from Central
and Eastern Europe, it is interesting that the media
usually show pictures of non-Europeans when presenting
the issue of migration into Germany [46]. The backlash
against people of color in Germany has been dramatic,
and many cities have begun to assign police to provide
protection on trains, busses and subways [47].
     Europe in the post-communist era has become the

[Page 20]

site of massive migrations to avoid civil wars such as


in former Yugoslavia, or to escape grinding poverty and
despair [48]. Germany, as the continent's richest
country and sharing contiguous borders with more
countries than any other European nation, has been the
main destination for hundreds of thousands of political
and economic refugees and migrants. 
     The response of the Bonn government to this influx
has been to close the borders as tightly as possible by
changing its asylum law effective July 1, 1993. This
law makes it impossible for someone seeking asylum to
do so in Germany if he/she has come from a "safe third
country;" i.e., from any of Germany's neighboring
states. What this means, in effect, is that it is now
virtually impossible for a refugee to reach Germany
legally. This has led to a huge decline in the number
of asylum seekers, from 322,599 in 1993 to 127,210 in
1994. Only 7.3 percent of the asylum requests were
approved during 1994 [49].
     This closing of the borders has become a
particularly grave problem for Central and Eastern
European countries, which are themselves rapidly
becoming a transit zone for migrants heading to Western
Europe and beyond. According to the IOM, transit routes

[Page 21]

from the Middle East, Asia and Africa are developing as
the transition of the former socialist bloc countries
creates conditions which increase possibilities for
international travel and migration. Some actually reach
the West but, having encountered stricter immigration
controls, hundreds of thousands are in a holding
pattern in the region [50]. According to a Russian
government official, Yuri Archipov, his country is also
experiencing growing migration from Africa, Asia and
the Near East. About 200 people arrive daily, and there
are now roughly a half million illegal immigrants in
Russia [51]. According to the Polish government, an
estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people from neighboring
eastern countries willing to work for "starvation
wages" now work illegally in Poland, principally in the
construction sector [52]. The dramatic wage
differentials between various Central and Eastern
European countries, coupled with the dream of somehow
getting into Germany, obviously serve as a big magnet
for much of this East-West migration [53]. 
     One of the German government's central tasks has
been to prevent further migration into the country by
making the western part of Europe a fortress. In fact,
this has been the most successfully adhered to aspect

[Page 22]

of the terms worked out in the EU's Maastricht Treaty,
and cooperation among EU members in seeking to keep
others out is generally excellent. It is only behind
this new wall, argues an editorial in the German
management magazine Capital, that ideals such as
freedom and equality, as well as the present high
standard of living, can be maintained. Leaving the
borders open, which would result in an eventual
equalization between East and West, "would lead to the
complete collapse of our social system with disastrous
consequences for political stability" [54].

III. Post-Unification Germany: The International      
     Context

     The search for identity among Germans is not
limited to the construction of a useable past at home,
but also extends to searching for a new role abroad.
After World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany
became a classical trading state in the typology
established by Richard Rosecrance [55]. Hanns Maull, a
German scholar, has made a similar argument about both
Germany and Japan, referring to them as "civilian
powers" [56]. Daniel Hamilton and others have referred
to the type of foreign policy pursued by Bonn as

[Page 23]

"checkbook diplomacy," an option which the new Germany
can no longer exercise as it did in the past. Hamilton,
who is now special advisor to the American ambassador
in Bonn, argues that being a purely "civilian" power is
a "luxury" which Germany can no longer afford [57].
President Clinton confirmed that this is indeed the
view of his administration in an extensive interview
with the S�ddeutsche Zeitung in early July 1994, in
which he called on Germany to abandon its past foreign
policy. "The Germans have no choice but to play a
leading role in global affairs," given their size and
economic power, stated Clinton in advance of his trip
to Germany [58]. 
     There are many in Germany who totally agree. One
of the most outspoken proponents of a stronger German
role in global affairs has been defense minister Volker
R�he. During a speech he delivered at the CDU's
Adenauer Foundation in Bonn in early July 1994, for
example, he reiterated one of his constant themes;
i.e., that Germany wants to become a "global partner"
with the United States. He envisions the gradual
establishment of a "northern zone of stability, which
would include the Americas, the European Union and
Russia" [59].

[Page 24]

     This will require, in the view of both Germans and
Americans, that Germany play a leading role within the
EU and that the two countries form a "strategic
partnership" with Central and Eastern Europe. 

a) Germany and the European Union

     Since unification Germany's position vis-…-vis the
EU has changed considerably, as the country now feels
vindicated in its efforts to gain acceptance as a
"normal country with an abnormal history" as Richard
von Weizs„cker once called it. Germany used its six-
month turn at the EU presidency in the second half of
1994, for example, to push its vision for Europe based
on the aggressive pursuit of a larger EU, as well as on
making the Brussels bureaucracy more fiscally
responsible. The German political elite is showing
quite clearly it is no longer willing to be the EU
"paymaster" [60].
     A constant barrage of negative comments about the
country's disproportionate financial commitment to the
EU has undoubtedly contributed to the dramatic decline
of support for European integration among Germans. For
example, in 1982 50% of West Germans thought that

[Page 25]

integration should proceed more quickly, while in 1984
an even higher number (62%) believed that. By 1992,
however, only 13% of West Germans and 8% of East
Germans endorsed that view [61]. At the rhetorical
level Germany is clearly still pursuing European
integration, but it is equally clear that its political
leaders are no longer timid in pushing their own agenda
now that unification has been achieved. As the
Economist phrased it: "European integration is at the
heart of Germany's view of Europe. But is that on
Germany's terms? Or on Europe's?" [62] And former
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has warned his fellow Germans
to be sensitive to the feelings of neighbors as the
country has embarked on a much more aggressively self-
centered foreign policy [63]. 
     Enthusiasm for a united Europe has also waned in
other EU countries, amid an environment of growing
nationalism and xenophobia. Arguing that "Euro-fatigue"
is a growing sentiment among EU members, President
Francois Mitterand warned about the cooling of support
for European unity in his final address to the European
Parliament in January 1995. Mitterand warned that

[Page 26]

     We must overcome our prejudices, our
     history. If we don't, one imperative will
     overtake us--nationalism and war. For war
     isn't just something of the past [in Western
     Europe]; it can also be something of the
     future [64].

     Thus the whole project of European unity, already
shaken by the divisive experience of the war in former
Yugoslavia, and lacking the cohesive conviction of a
common enemy which had formerly been provided by the
communist bloc, is in jeopardy. While ever closer
integration is taking place at the economic level, the
political will to further this process appears to be
waning. 
     In any case, Germany's ability to become a hegemon
even within the European Union (i.e, a power which can
enforce its national interest at will) is far from
certain. This is undoubtedly a main reason for the
commitment of Germany's political class to maintain
very close relations with the United States in the
years to come.

b) The Re-Styled Berlin-Washington Axis

[Page 27]

     As indicated above, Germany's new assertiveness
vis-…-vis its neighbors has the full blessing of the
United States. Washington has been one of the primary
catalysts for pushing Germany into a more aggressive
foreign policy role, with the view of making it a
junior partner. As Hamilton phrased this endorsement:
"Neither Germany nor America can afford to stay home
alone. Domestic renewal in each country depends on
active engagement abroad" [65]. He refers to the United
States and Europe as a "community of shared values,"
and points to the "deep and extensive ties" which have
developed between Germany and the US since World War II
[66]. In his most telling statement about the purpose
of the German-American "strategic alliance," Hamilton
argues:

     For the first time in sixty years the
     transatlantic relationship is being defined
     and tested as severely by economic as by
     security challenges. Global economic forces
     now impinge more directly and powerfully on
     the well-being of the average American or
     European than do military security issues.
     Unless more effective mechanisms can be
     developed to preempt and resolve economic
     and monetary conflicts between the advanced
     industrialized nations, the frontlines of
     the post-Cold War era may be drawn between
     the victors of the Cold War themselves.
     (italics added) [67]

[Page 28]

     These sentiments are expressed by others as well.
For example, W.R. Smyser, in a stunningly eurocentric
world view, argues that the "global concert" used to be
led by Great Britain, was then taken over by the United
States, and now has the US and Germany as "the most
prominent members" [68]. And the former American
Ambassador to Germany, Undersecretary of State for
Europe Richard Holbrook, is quoted as saying: "In Asia
we have common human-rights and political views, but we
are destined to be political and economic
rivals...Germany is the key player in moving the Cold
War alliance into a new post-Cold War phase and Clinton
and Kohl are at the heart of it" [69]. 
     Wolfgang Sch„uble, in a major speech at the
Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C., echoed the
same sentiments, stating that in a world characterized
by new risks and dangers of global dimension "problems
have become indivisible" and the "global redistributive
struggle is getting ever harder." According to Sch„uble
"the West more than ever before depends on a community
of shared values of the free democracies;" a
"Schicksalsgemeinschaft" (a community fated to be) of
the West which forms the basis for common global
responsibilities. Germany is part of the EU but also a

[Page 29]

partner in the Atlantic alliance, and Sch„uble called
for collective security to get a handle on the new
world order [70].
     So who is the new enemy against whom this
Schicksalsgemeinschaft is directed? The new fronts
appear to be drawn between Europe and America on the
one hand, and Japan and its Asian neighbors on the
other. As Richard Rosecrance has phrased it with
disarming honestly: "...it is imperative that the
economies of Europe and North America follow a common
approach toward their Asian competitors" [71]. As
usual, however, economic conflict and threats to core
interests will be couched in moral terms. During the
times in which the threat came from "real socialism,"
with its lack of freedom and mobility, the operative
term was "democracy." In the new post-Cold War era,
this new East-West struggle will be couched in terms of
"culture." As Fareed Zakaria put it recently: "Culture
is in" [72].
     As John Dower has pointed out in his classic study
of World War Two in the Pacific, igniting racial and
cultural hatreds is not hard to do. He shows "just how
enduring and universal the old images that had been
attached to nonwhite peoples since the sixteenth

[Page 30]

century really (are)" [73]. His extensive study shows
how Asians have responded to allegations of being polar
opposites to their conquerors (e.g., savages, children,
madmen, and beasts, and, "of course, as pagan and evil
opposed to Christian and good" with their own notions
of racial and cultural superiority [74]. 
     We need not go far back in history, however, to
find confirmation of these anti-Japanese feelings in
the West. In 1991, for example, the French Prime
Minister, Edith Cresson, was quoted as referring to the
Japanese as "little yellow men" who "stay up all night
thinking abut ways to screw the Americans and the
Europeans. They are our common enemy" [75]. One month
earlier she had brought "Nippophobia" in France to new
heights by calling the Japanese "a nation of ants"
[76].
     In an era in which populations in the core have
lost the ideological certainties of the Cold War, while
simultaneously being subjected to social and economic
changes unparalleled in their own lifetimes, the soil
is fertile for domestic manifestations of racism and
xenophobia to turn to enemies abroad. Given the
extremely uneven distribution of wealth globally [77],
pressures on the rich core will only increase in the

[Page 31]

years and decades to come. Blaming the booming Asia-
Pacific region for some, if not all (yet!), of these
pressures is an entirely predictable scenario.

IV. The Asian Challenge

     As Paul Krugman reminded his readers in a recent
article, in the early phase of the Cold War the
economic progress made by the Soviet Union was quite
phenomenal. This led many to speculate about the
superiority of central planning and, indeed, of
socialism itself [78]. He cites the warning voice of
Newsweek in 1959 that the Soviet Union may well be "on
the high road to economic domination of the world," as
well as a similar assessment by then CIA Director Allen
Dulles made in hearings held by the Joint Economic
Committee [79]. What is interesting, of course, is that
these economic considerations were largely lost in
mainstream scholarly works, which treated the conflict
between these two competing social and economic systems
mainly from the "high politics" perspective of military
and strategic matters. 
     In the post-Cold War era, we will likewise witness
an ideological struggle between the Eurocentric core and

[Page 32]

its challengers in East Asia, where phenomenal growth
rates have made the region the most economically
dynamic in the world. Japan, the only non-European
member of the core, is at the heart of this Asian
challenge, with a number of emerging economies (the
"little tigers" plus the ASEAN countries) increasingly
tied into its economic nexus. Conflict is programmed
into this situation:

     The growth mechanism in the southern tier is
     critically dependent on Japan as the
     supplier of capital goods, high-value-added
     components, technology, and aid, and on the
     United States as the demander of first
     resort. Virtually all the high-performing
     East Asian countries run large trade
     deficits with Japan and large surpluses with
     the United States...These imbalances are
     driving the well-known trade tensions in the
     region [80].

Leonard Silk and Tom Kono argue that

[Page 33]

     Central to the trade issue are differences
     between Japanese-style capitalism and the
     Western model. American "revisionists" have
     long argued that Japanese capitalism is not
     only different from but essentially
     incompatible with Western capitalism - a
     view that key members of the Clinton
     administration, including President Bill
     Clinton himself, appear to share [81].

     The phenomenal rise of the Newly Industrializing
Countries (NICs) in Asia, as well as the more recent
successes of ASEAN, is well documented [82]. The region
has become a major competitor for the traditional
export sectors of the old Euro-American core states,
and its low wage and social security structures have
made it a serious threat to the competitiveness of core
countries. Although there is some debate about the
long-term strength of these economies [83], what
interests us here is that, for the first time in
centuries, Western economic hegemony is increasingly
being challenged.
     Japan has become the center around which this
enormous economic growth has taken place. Between 1965

[Page 34]

and 1985, for example, over half of all development
assistance and foreign direct investments received by
the ASEAN countries came from Japan. Since the Plaza
Accord was signed on September 22, 1985 Japanese investments in
neighboring countries have exploded, while Japan itself has served
as a model for effective industrial development,
particularly for the NIEs. James Fallows refers to the
date of the signing of the Plaza Accord, which set off
this chain of events, as being of as much historical
importance as November 9th, 1989, the day the Berlin
Wall was opened. According to him, this is the day the
Asian economic era began [84].
     After the Plaza Accord a period of unprecedented
growth, which the Japanese refer to as endaka, enabled
Japan to become the dominant economic power in Asia.
Japan's national currency was worth more than ever
before abroad, making Japanese foreign investments
enormously attractive and helping Japanese companies to
set up basic assembly plants throughout East Asia [85].
This will have a negative effect on the tradition of
offering permanent employment to workers in Japan, who
are increasingly finding themselves competing with low
wage countries in the region. Meanwhile, the Japanese
government, as a result of 

[Page 35]

     the end of the Cold War and mounting
     economic tensions with the United States
     [has] encouraged greater Japanese diplomatic
     activity in East Asia in order to cultivate
     a more hospitable regional environment...
     Japanese also feel an affinity in terms of
     basic values and social customs toward their
     Asian neighbors - especially those similarly
     influenced by the Confucian cultural
     tradition [86].

     The general emphasis of scholars in discussing the
Asian exception to the "Western model" emphasize its
economic dimension [87]. Our own analysis goes beyond
this purely economic dimension, however, and argues
that the reason why the "Asian miracle" is so
threatening is because it squarely challenges five
centuries of European hegemony and claims of
superiority in all aspects of life - political, social,
cultural, as well as racial. As James Blaut has pointed
out,

[Page 36]

     European writers over the past half-
     millennium have tended to view Asia as a
     place where people are inherently unfree and
     society is inherently unchanging...It was
     accepted as an axiomatic truth, rarely
     questioned, but efforts were made to explain
     this inherent "Oriental despotism" (as it
     came to be called) in terms of everything
     from theology to race to environment [88].

     To Blaut, the notion of European superiority in
all aspects of human existence (what he and others
refer to as Eurocentrism) has become so deeply
ingrained in European minds that it has become "a
unique set of beliefs, and uniquely powerful, because
it is the intellectual and scholarly rationale for one
of the most powerful social interests of the European
elite" [89]. He insists that this belief system is 
entirely linked to the experience of European colonialism
and neocolonialism, both of which rest on the exploitation
of the wealth and resources of the colonized. 
     And Samir Amin, in his work on Eurocentrism,
explains how this phenomenon differs from traditional
ethnocentrism:

[Page 37]

     Eurocentrism is not the sum of Westerners'
     preconceptions, mistakes, and blunders with
     respect to other peoples. After all, these
     errors are no more serious than the
     corresponding presumptions that non-European
     peoples hold with respect to Westerners.
     Eurocentrism is thus not a banal
     ethnocentrism testifying simply to the
     limited horizons beyond which no people on
     this planet has yet truly been able to go.
     Eurocentrism is a specifically modern
     phenomenon...it constitutes one dimension of
     the culture and ideology of the modern
     capitalist world [90].

     Our argument here is that the harmony of cultures
presented by both Germans and Americans in explaining
the future of their countries' relations with one
another is in recognition that their common
"Eurocentrist" project is under attack [91]. Thus,
while the Cold War alliance was based on an ideology of
virulent anti-communism, the ideological/
superstructural justification for this new alliance
within the core will be presented in form of a "clash
of civilizations." 

[Page 38]

     The idea that politics in the future will be
shaped by such clashes was advanced by Samuel
Huntington, not coincidentally Director of the
Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.
He argued in the Summer of 1993 that 

     a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what
     global politics is likely to be in the
     coming years..will be the clash of
     civilizations...With the end of the Cold
     War, international politics moves out of its
     Western phase, and its center piece becomes
     the interaction between the West and non-
     Western civilizations and among non-Western
     civilizations [92].
 
     Huntington, reflecting his own ideological bias,
claims that this clash has nothing to do with the
respective political and economic systems found inside
these countries, but rather with "their culture and
civilization" [93]. He also does not explain why this
clash is going to take place now, except to point to
the pressures of globalization and modernization which
create kind of a cultural backlash. 

[Page 39]

     A German observer, Eberhard Rondholz, has referred
to Huntington's approach as a new policy of
containment, this time against emerging competing
cultures. Rondholz finds a growing number of supporters
in Germany for this idea of cultural spheres, which in
the European context means drawing lines between the
Latin/Roman Occident and Eastern Christianity, between
enlightenment and orthodoxy, between democracy and
absolutism [94].
     To us this seems to be the crucial point, however:
It is precisely at the moment in which the European
core countries are facing a new round of challenges to
their hegemony that new justifications for this
conflict are being sought at the ideological level. We
argue that the coming "clash of civilizations" will be
brought about because, for the first time in centuries,
European notions of racial and cultural superiority are
being challenged in the economic sphere. Indeed, issues
of culture and race will draw the new fault lines that
determine the fatal categories of friend and enemy in
the coming century. Our argument thus is that the
phenomenal rise of East and Southeast Asia over the
past decade has threatened not only the economic
interests of the Western core nations, but it has also

[Page 40]

seriously undermined European notions of racial and
cultural superiority, a deeply internalized sense of
cultural-racial self-identity. "Race," "culture," and
"civilization" will thus become the new fighting words
in the future world of "geo-economics," just as
"democracy" and "freedom" were the guise under which
the struggle for the maintenance of core interests was
carried out in the Cold War era.

V. The Asian Response: New Cultural Assertiveness

     The fault line of culture and race is not new. In
core-periphery relations the issue of race and
ethnicity has always played a dominant role, although
one which a self-centered and culturally arrogant
Europe has not focussed on as much as its victims in
the periphery. Frantz Fanon once described this aspect
of the core-periphery relationship by stating that in
the periphery it was not primarily class which assigned
your station in life, but: 

     ...the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a
     given race, a given species. In the colonies the
     economic substructure is also a superstructure.
     The cause is the consequence; you are rich
     because you are white, you are white because you
     are rich [95].

[Page 41]

     This racial fault line, a byproduct of European
colonialism which was temporarily overshadowed by the
ideological divisions of the Cold War, will show
seismic activity for the first time in decades. It
should thus more properly be called a return to the
status quo ante earlier in the century, at which time
the African-American scholar and activist W.E.B. Du
Bois predicted that the "problem of the twentieth
century" would be "the problem of the color line."
Though undoubtedly correct about his prediction that
"the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men
in Asia and Africa and the islands of the sea" [96]
would be the source of future global conflict, Du
Bois's prediction did not foresee the way in which the
communist challenge would temporarily freeze the
"problem of the color line."
     Eleanor Roosevelt, chair of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights in the immediate post-war
years, said of her experiences: "An age-old sore had
come to light and I felt the weight of history for
which the nations of the Western world are now to be
called to account" [97]. The weight of history to
which she was referring was that "we, because our skins
are white, necessarily look down upon all peoples whose

[Page 42]

skins are yellow or black or brown. This thought is
never out of their minds" [98].
     The only non-European core nation is Japan, whose
history over the past century has been one of trying to
find acceptance in the white world by adapting as much
as necessary while retaining as much of its own culture
and identity as possible. The response of Europe to
Japan's ascendance to core status was marred from the
beginning by the fact that membership in the core had
always been the privilege of white Europe [99]. For
example, an attempt on the part of Japan to get an
amendment calling for racial equality included in the
preamble of the League of Nations covenant failed,
largely over the objection of US President Wilson who
argued that "The trouble is that if this Commission
should pass it, it would surely raise the race issue
throughout the world" [100]. 
     The issue was raised among the non-European
peoples anyway, and the hypocrisy of the colonizing
nations did not go unnoticed. Nor did it go unnoticed
that Japan, a fellow Asian nation, had succeeded at the
white man's game. Karl Kautsky wrote long ago:

[Page 43]

     The people of the East have been defeated by
     the Europeans so often that they thought it
     hopeless to resist. Europeans had the same
     opinion. Their colonial policy, which
     deceived and disposed of foreign peoples as
     if they were cattle, was based on this.
     But as soon as the Japanese had broken the
     ice, this had an immediate effect on the
     whole of the East. Both the whole of the Far
     East and the whole of the Mohammedan world
     rose up with independent policies, to resist
     all foreign domination [101].

     As John Dower has pointed out, it was Japan that
further shattered the mystique of Western superiority
during World War II [102]. Japan was also the only core
power to attend the founding conference of the non-
aligned movement in Bandung in 1955, expressing its
solidarity with the peoples of Africa and Asia in their
struggle against European colonialism. The argument
here it not that Japan did this unselfishly or that
suspicions of Japanese intentions do not exist among
fellow Asians, but that the mere fact of not being
Caucasian or Christian provides an element of cohesion
[103].

[Page 44]

     With the growing economic links between Japan and
its neighbors brought about since endaka began,
Japanese television programs have begun to emphasize
the need for Asian unity (kyosei). Elsewhere in Asia,
pride in these economic achievements has also begun the
process of creating an Asian consciousness which
reflects a new level of self-confidence vis-…-vis the
former colonial masters. "Asia will no longer put up
with being treated simply as a card; it will demand
respect as a player," argues Yoichi Funabashi, the
Washington bureau chief of Asahi Shimbun [104]. An
adviser to Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir bin
Mohamad, quoted his boss to James Fallows in 1991, "We
must cease to be brown Sahibs, brown Englishmen. We
must find our own roots in Asia" [105]. Kishore
Mahbubani, a senior official in Singapore's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, expressed these sentiments the most
bluntly:

     It is difficult for a European or North
     American to understand the momentousness of
     the psychological revolution in East Asia
     because they cannot step into East Asian
     minds. Their minds have never been wrapped
     in colonialism. They have never struggled
     with the subconscious assumption that
     perhaps they were second-rate human beings,
     never good enough to be number one. The
     growing realization of East Asians that they
     can do anything as well as, if not better
     than, other cultures has led to an explosion
     of confidence [106].

[Page 45]

     This new Asian assertiveness and insistence on
defining its own values and societal norms is occurring
at precisely the moment in which matters of race,
culture and civilization have also begun to play a much
larger role in public and political discourse in the
West. Thus, as economic conditions inside the core
countries continue to deteriorate and governments grope
for ways to create new forms of allegiance from
increasingly cynical publics, the stage is set for a
"clash of civilizations" between Japan and its Asian
neighbors on the one hand, and the United States and
Germany as the key members of the Western core.

VI. Conclusion

     Making Japan and its people into a new enemy is a
process which has already begun, particularly in the
United States [107], although the process itself is
obscured by a general popular threat perception about
people of color. In Europe this has found expression in
a more diffused form of general xenophobia and attacks
against outsiders. The underlying sentiment on both
continents appears to be the same, however: a sense
that non-Europeans (non-whites) are threatening the

[Page 46]

position of economic and cultural superiority enjoyed
by Europeans for centuries. 
     Several factors account for this embryonic but
growing change.
     1) The end of the Cold War has created an
ideological vacuum. The implosion of the "red threat"
has left populations and leaders alike searching for a
new sense of identity. Paradoxically, this has infused
a new mood of cynicism about Western democracy and a
more openly critical stance toward established
politics. Events in Italy have been most dramatic in
this regard, but in the absence of a strong external
enemy, politics as usual has come under severe scrutiny
in all other core countries as well. The notion that
Western-style democracy is experiencing its own crisis
of legitimation has begun to accumulate a substantial
body of scholarly evidence [108].
     2) Threats to Western security are no longer
clearly defined in the form of the Warsaw Pact powers.
While the collapse of communism has also led to the
dismantling of large sections of those countries'
military-industrial complexes, no corresponding process
has taken place in the West. Thus, finding new enemies
is seen by the military, the arms industry, as well as

[Page 47]

politicians whose entire careers have been devoted to
an anti-communist agenda, as preferable to losing
decades of power and privilege. As deployments of the
American military in the post-Cold War era have shown,
Third World crises so far have been used to fill much
of the gap [109].
     3) The average core citizen is experiencing
growing economic hardships resulting from the twin
processes of rising globalization and accelerating
technological changes. These have led to a systematic
destruction of manufacturing jobs in the core, with a
resultant drop in real wages and structural
unemployment [110]. By 1994, thirty-six million people
in the OECD countries were out of work. Within the core
G-7 countries, only the US and Japan had below-double-
digit unemployment levels in 1994. The figures for the
US, although they look good on paper, hide the fact
that "today 6 million Americans are working part-time
who would like to work full-time, and almost 9 million
are unemployed" [111]. Paul Kennedy posed the
difficulties ahead with the following question:
"...where will we find jobs for young, ambitious
Europeans coming out of school?...Political instability
is often rooted in widespread social despair" [112].

[Page 48]

     4) Populations in both Western Europe and the
United States have begun to react angrily to the
growing tide of people seeking entry into their
countries, either as immigrants, refugees, or asylum
seekers. As discussed above, one of the anchors of
post-Maastricht cooperation within the EU has been
designing structures designed to keep foreigners out.
     In the United States, concern about growing
competition from immigrants (legal as well as illegal)
has manifested itself in a variety of ways. One much
discussed aspect of this has been a backlash of "white
males" in the November 1994 elections, in which
conservative Republicans were able to make an
unprecedented sweep [113]. This will have repercussions
on American foreign policy as well, since many of the
senior Republican politicians in Washington are known
for their extremely conservative and nationalistic
views [114]. Just like in Europe, however, broad
consensus exists on the need to curb the influx of
immigrants among the most powerful political groupings.
Thus President Clinton has promised the Republican-led
Congress his full cooperation on the issue [115].
     Mario Cuomo, in his final speech before turning
over his job as Governor of New York to his Republican

[Page 49]

successor, voiced his concern about this agenda in the
following words: "You're turning those white factory
workers all over the country against people of color.
You're turning them against immigrants. You have turned
the middle class to look downward instead of up. And
they're now pitted against the poorest" [116].
     These xenophobic impulses are not only generated
in Washington, however. In California, for example, a
radically anti-immigrant "Proposition 187" (called
"Save our State") won in the same election, calling for
a cut in public services, including education and
health care, to illegal immigrants and requiring
educators, police and public health officials to report
anyone suspected of being an illegal immigrant [117].
The Mexican government has strongly condemned the
measure and expressed concern that it may undermine the
spirit in which the country joined the NAFTA bloc
[118].  
     Another interesting manifestation of this rise in
anti-foreign sentiments in the United States is the
rekindled debate about differences in native
intelligence among various racial groups. According to
Herrnstein and Murray, authors of a controversial book
on the relationship of race and class [119], the mean IQ

[Page 50]

of African Americans is 85, compared to 100 for white
Americans and 111-115 for East Asians. As Alan Ryan has
pointed out in a lengthy review article, in the United
States this debate has always been driven by "fear of
new immigrants...fears of the `dilution' of the `pure
bred' white stock by Jewish or Negro blood were the
common coin of academic discussion throughout the first
forty years of this century" [120]. It is interesting,
of course, that the debate has resurfaced with a
vengeance at this point in time.
     5) Within this increasingly bellicose climate
governments are hard pressed to use their power and
influence to maintain current standards of living for
the majority. Unfortunately, governments have begun to
lose much of their competence in regulating markets,
which themselves are globalizing ever more rapidly. As
Herman Schwartz has pointed out, as a proportion of
total economic activity, global trade did not regain
its 1914 levels until roughly 1980. He argues that the
era of postwar stability, in which states dominated
markets, has thus come to an end and that our present
era much more closely resembles conditions at the end
of the 19th century [121]. The implications of this
development for world peace are ominous, especially if

[Page 51]

one compares events leading up to World War I with
those discussed in this paper. Then, like now, the
power of established core powers, Great Britain as the
first among them, was challenged by the United States
and Germany. Even then, cultural affinities rather than
economic realities alone determined the pattern of
future alliances. As James Joll has pointed out, "From
the purely economic point of view the United States was
at least as dangerous a rival [to Britain] as Germany;
yet there was no talk of a growing antagonism between
the two countries" [122]. Joll shows that anti-German
sentiments rose over several decades prior to the
actual outbreak of the First World War and acquired an
inexorable logic of their own on both sides.
     In the present era, in which foreign trade issues
are once again becoming paramount for governments
[123], the rise of Asia as a challenger to European
core hegemony may well have a similarly destabilizing
effect. 
     Thus, as the world is heading into an era of
disorder, a climate of opinion is emerging within the
core in which new lines of friends and enemies are
being drawn. As this paper has sought to show, Germany
is much too preoccupied with its significant domestic

[Page 52]

problems and too burdened with ghosts of the past to
become a hegemonic power on its own. The United States,
on the other hand, is seeking to maintain its
continuing preponderance in the military/strategic
sector while recognizing its loss of hegemonic power in
the economic sphere. Enlisting Germany as a junior
partner in its ambitious global agenda makes sense.
Germany, tamed by the experiences of the first half of
this century, is an easier and more compliant partner
in Europe than Great Britain or France, for example. It
is also well versed in the art of multilateral
diplomacy and already a key member of the world economy
[124].
     Thus, as the economic balance of power is
beginning to tilt in the direction of East Asia,
Germany and the United States will become the wardens
to protect the Eurocentric project. As this paper has
tried to show, the stage has thus been set for the
"coming clash of civilizations." 

[Page 53]

                       ENDNOTES


1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
New York: The Free Press, 1992, p. xi.

2. See, for example, Edward N. Luttwak, "The Coming
Global War for Economic Power: There are no nice guys on
the battlefield of geo-economics," The National Times,
March 1994, pp. 48-54. Luttwak argues that "today...the
emerging geo-economic struggle for high-technology
industrial supremacy among Americans, Europeans, and
Japanese is rapidly eroding their old alliance
solidarity, and the ill feelings now released between
them are beginning to affect all other trading countries
of any importance." (p.53)

3. Interestingly enough, these types of arguments have
emerged in all three countries. See, for example, Jeffrey
E. Garten, A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany and the
Struggle for Supremacy, New York: Times Books, 1992;
Lester C. Thurow, Head to Head: The coming Economic
Battle among Japan, Europe, and America, New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1992; Shintaro Ishihara, The

[Page 54]

Japan That Can Say No: Why Japan Will be First Among
Equals, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991; Konrad Seitz,
Die japanisch-amerikanische Herausforderung, 6th ed.,
Bonn: Verlag Aktuell, 1994.

4. Alliance here is used in terms of formal as well as
informal networks established between governments, not
so-called "strategic alliances" between transnational
corporations.

5. See Steven Muller, "German Dilemmas," Problems of
Post-Communism, Premier Issue, Fall 1994, pp. 37-44.

6. See Karl Taro Greenfield, "Return of the Yellow
Peril," The Nation, May 11, 1992.

7. Sebastian Mallaby, "Death of a role model," in:
"Oriental renaissance," The Economist: A Survey of Japan,
July 9th, 1994, p. 4.

8. Quentin Peel, "East Germany sees former Comecon trade
fall," Financial Times, 19 August 1993.

9. "Die Beatmung eines schrottreifen Monsters,"
S�ddeutsche Zeitung, 22 March 1994.

[Page 55]

10. Judy Dempsey, "The high price of German unity,"
Financial Times Survey: Restructuring of Eastern Germany,
Financial Times, May 4, 1994.

11. "Verpaáte Chancen im Osten," S�ddeutsche Zeitung, 2
January 1994.

12. "Ostdeutschland," Handelsblatt, 9/10 October 1993.

13. "Kaum Export aus Ostdeutschland," Die Welt, 22 June
1994.

14.  See Wolfgang Seibelt, "Zur Situation der
”ffentlichen Verwaltung in den neuen Bundesl„ndern. Ein
vorl„ufiges Res�mee," in: Wolfgang Seibelt/Arthur
Benz/Heinrich M„ding, eds., Verwaltungsreform und
Verwaltungspolitik im Prozeá der deutschen Einigung,
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1993, pp. 477-498.

15. S�ddeutsche Zeitung, 28 April 1993.

16. "Treuhand katapultiert Schuldenstand auf zwei
Billionen Mark," Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 April 1994.

[Page 56]

17. For example, a former director of a regional Treuhand
office in Halle on the run from German law was arrested
in the summer of 1994 in Texas for speeding in his Rolls
Royce.

18. Quentin Peel, "Sale of the Century ends," Financial
Times Survey: Restructuring of Eastern Germany, Financial
Times, May 4, 1994. For a scathing critique of the way in
which this "privatization" has taken place, see Otto
K”hler, Die groáe Enteignung: Wie die Treuhand eine
Volkswirtschaft liquidierte, Munich: Droemersche
Verlagsanstalt, June 1994. K”hler points out, inter alia,
that the Treuhand board of directors reads like a Who's
Who of West German top managers, whose interests more
clearly lay in protecting their own organizations'
interests rather than making sure that the East German
"people's property" get divided fairly among those who
initially worked for it.

19. "Ostdeutsche �ber Wirtschaftslage skeptisch,"
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 April 1994.

20. Die Woche, 29 December 1993.

[Page 57]

21. "Bl�hende Landschaften: Aufschwung Ost treibt erste
Knospen," Die Welt, 7 July 1994.

22. This argument was made by Dr. Norbert Bub in his talk
"German Economy on the Up," at the Nomura Research
Institute Frankfurt, 7 July 1994. In the written
(unpublished) text of his talk he wrote: "The extreme
flow of goods and services towards the eastern part has
become a most interesting and profitable additional
business for western German suppliers...in a net view,
western German "exports" to the eastern part of the
country are still having an enormous trigger impact on
the western German economy. Therefore the common view
that building up eastern Germany's economy constitutes an
excessive pressure on the West has to be reconsidered."

23. According to an Ifo survey of West German industry in
summer 1994, the employment situation will not improve
before 1998, as companies do not plan to make significant
new investments in either the eastern or western part of
the country. Indeed, plans are to let more employees go.
"Industrie streicht auch 1995 Jobs," Frankfurter
Rundschau, 15 July 1994.

[Page 58]

24. Federal Economics Ministry, Bericht der
Bundesregierung zur Zukunftssicherung des Standorts
Deutschland, Bonn, 2 September 1993.

25. Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie, Sicherung des
Produktionsstandortes Deutschland, Cologne, November
1993.

26. A worldwide Gallop poll of consumers commissioned by
the US advertising agency Bozell to determine preferences
for products of the twelve biggest exporting nations
found that Japan scored highest with almost 39% in very
good or excellent category, followed by Germany (36%),
and the USA (34.3%). "Consumer patriotism" was highest in
Japan, where 76% of those polled rated their own products
as either very good or excellent. Germany's rating as the
second most popular exporter of goods clearly gives a
boost to the trade unions' arguments about the country's
international competitiveness. Richard Tomkins, "Japan,
Germany and US make best quality goods, say consumers,"
Financial Times, 11 February 1994.

27. Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), "Standort
Deutschland: Solide Basis - Kein Grund zum Schwarzsehen;
Geschweige denn zur Panik," Informationen zur

[Page 59]

Wirtschafts- und Strukturpolitik, Nr. 12/93, D�sseldorf:
2 November 1993.

28. "Der Anteil der Ausl„nder am Arbeitsmarkt w„chst,"
Handelsblatt, 21 October 1993.

29. Commission of the European Communities, Central and
Eastern Eurobarometer, Brussels, February 1993.

30. Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag,
Produktionsverlagerung ins Ausland: Ergebnisse einer
Unternehmensbefragung, Bonn, November 1993. 

31. Klaus-Dieter Schmidt and Petra Naujoks, Western
Enterprises in Eastern Markets The German Perspective,
Kiel Working Paper No. 607, December 1993, p. 1. 

32. See Yoshikazu Takao, Chi Hung Kwan and Masayuki
Kichikawa, "Long-Term Outlook: Japan in an Era of Global
Structural Adjustments," NRI Quarterly, Tokyo, Spring
1994, pp. 2-35.

33. William Dawkins, "Japan looks to low-cost areas,"
Financial Times, 3 June 1994.

[Page 60]

34. Barbara Odrich, "Japans Unternehmen wandern aus,"
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 September 1993.

35. See, for example, Paul Krugman, "Competitiveness: A
Dangerous Obsession," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994,
as well as the responses by many distinguished economists
entitled "The Fight Over Competitiveness: A Zero-Sum
Debate?" in Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, pp. 186-
203.

36. See, for example, Erhard Kantzenbach, "Germany as a
Business Location," Intereconomics, January/February
1994, pp. 3-10; Michael Frenkel, "Germany's International
Competitive Position under Siege," Ibid, pp. 10-17.

37. This factor is picked up in a cartoon-type graph in
the July 20, 1994 issue of The Straits Times, published
in Singapore, depicting a very fat German worker whose
average hourly compensation in 1992, including benefits,
amounted to $39.62, compared to Singapore, $8.34 and
Mexico, $ 4.10. 

38. For the difficult process of "mental unification" of
the two Germanies, see, for example, Michael Lukas

[Page 61]

Moeller and Hans-Joachim Maaz, Die Einheit beginnt zu
zweit. Ein deutsch-deutsches Zwiegespr„ch, Berlin:
Rowohlt Verlag 1991; Reinhard Bobach, "Mentale
Konversion? Kulturelle Aspekte der deutschen
Vereinigung," Deutschland Archiv, Vol. 26, No. 1, January
1993, pp. 7-20.

39. The PDS scored an impressive victory in last year's
local, state, and federal elections among East Germans,
showing a consistent level of voter support of around 20
percent.

40. Fritz Stern, "Germany's Divisive Unity," Foreign
Affairs, September/October 1993, pp. 108-125.

41. Wolfgang Scha�ble, most likely successor to Helmut
Kohl in the CDU and one of the country's most prominent
conservative politicians, outlines his strongly
nationalistic views in his book Und der Zukunft
zugewandt, Siedler Verlag, 1994. He admonishes Germans to
believe more strongly in family values and their nation.

42. For the painful efforts at reconstructing German
history, see, for example, Uwe Uffelmann,

[Page 62]

"Identit„tsbilding und Geschichtsdidaktik," Aus Politik
und Zeitgeschehen, B/41/94, 14 October 1994, pp. 12-20.
In the same edition of the journal, see also Horst Kuss,
"Historisches Lernen im Wandel," pp. 21-30.

43. For a collection of very thoughtful essays written by
some of Germany's major contemporary thinkers and public
figures on the ambiguities which haunt reunified Germany,
see Umdenken: Deutschland, seine Rolle, seine inneren
Umbr�che, Hamburg: ZEIT-Punkte, Nr. 3/1994.

44. See, for example, Wir machen uns stark --- FšR
DEUTSCHE INTERESSEN, Party Program of the Republikaner
Partei, passed at the party's congress in Augsburg on
26/27 June 1993.

45. "Sorge šber Brutalit„t in Europa," Frankfurter
Rundschau, 7 July 1994. See also a detailed study
conducted by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki entitled
"Foreigners Out" Xenophobia and Right Wing Violence in
Germany, October 1992.

46. For a critical analysis of the role of the media in
creating xenophobic sentiments, see Georgios Tsapanos,

[Page 63]

"Immer in Anf�hrungszeichen - Ausl„nder und
Fremdenfeindlichkeit als Thema der Medien," in:
Entstehung von Fremdenfeindlichkeit: Die Verantwortung
von Politik und Medien, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation,
1993, pp. 93-101.

47. "Schutz der Fahrg„ste verst„rkt," S�ddeutsche
Zeitung, 17 October 1994, p. 6; "U-Bahn, S-Bahn, Bus: Die
Angst f„hrt mit," Berliner Morgenpost, 9 October 1994, p.
9; "Zeichen der Gewalt: Gesichter unserer Stadt,"
Berliner Morgenpost, 23 October 1994, p. 9.

48. According to the World Bank, five years of post-
communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe have
created huge unemployment and social dislocations. Of the
region's 320 million people, 58 million live below the
poverty line ($120 monthly income per capita), of which
50 million are "new poor." See Branco Milanovic, "The
Cost of Transition: 50 Million New Poor and Growing
Inequality," Transition, Vol. 5, Number 8, The World
Bank, 8 October 1994.

49. "Number of Asylum-Seekers Dropped Sharply in 1994,"
The Week in Germany, New YorK; German Information Center,
January 13, 1995, pp. 1-2.

[Page 64]

50. IOM (International Organization for Migration) Press
Release, "Transit Migration Soars in Poland, Bulgaria and
Czech Republic," Budapest, 13 May 1994.

51. "Ruálands Beh”rden �ber Zuwanderung besorgt,"
S�ddeutsche Zeitung, 7 July 1994.

52. "Die Schattenseite des Aufschwungs", S�ddeutsche
Zeitung, 7 July 1994.

53. Average monthly wages at current exchange rates in
eastern Europe varied from $58 (Bulgaria) to $240
(Hungary) in 1991; from $66-70 (Romania and Bulgaria,
respectively) to $280 (Hungary) in 1992; and from $85
(Romania) to $320 (Hungary) in mid-1993. UN Economic
Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1993-
1994, New York and Geneva, 1994, p. 100.

54. Johannes Gross, "Neue Bl”cke: Die Welt gliedert sich
erneut in Bl”cke," Capital, 7/94, p. 3.

55. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State:
Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York:
Basic Books, 1986; -- America's Economic Resurgence: A
Bold New Strategy, New York: HarperCollins, 1990.

[Page 65]

56. Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian
Powers," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1990, pp. 91-
106.

57. These arguments were raised in an enormously
influential study conducted under the auspices of the
Carnegie Endowment for Peace. See Daniel S. Hamilton,
Beyond Bonn: America and the Berlin Republic, Washington,
1994, p. 17.

58. "Deutschland muá eine F�hrungsrolle �bernehmen,"
S�ddeutsche Zeitung, 4 July 1994.

59. "R�he: Europa will Amerikas globale Politik
mitgestalten," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July
1994.

60. Interestingly, it is Germany's industry which is most
adamantly opposed to this rhetoric and has published a
study showing that the country not only pays the most
into the EU coffers but also benefits the most
economically. See Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag,
Deutschland - Zahlmeister in Europa? Ein Beitrag zur
Versachlichung der "Nettozahler-Diskussion", Brussels,
May 1994.

[Page 66]

61. Renate K”cher, "Pl„doyer f�r ein europ„isches
Pathos," Kas Auslandsinformationen: Europa, Vol. 10,
1/1994, Bonn: Adenauer Foundation, pp. 121.

62. "Germany's Europe," The Economist, June 11, 1994, p.
25. See also Mark N. Nelson, "Forward March. Germany is
Ready to Lead, but is Europe Prepared to Follow? Even
Germans are Nervous About New Global Role; First Job: EU
Presidency," Wall Street Journal Europe, Vol. XII, No.
106, July 1-2, 1994.

63. Helmut Schmidt, "Einf�hlen, nicht auftrumpfen," Die
Zeit, Nr. 18, 29 April 1994, p. 9. On the growing worries
of other Europeans about Germany's growing assertiveness,
see also Peter Glotz, "Der grӇte Brocken auf dem
Kontinent. Wir Deutschen sollten uns klarmachen: Die
Nachbarn miátrauen uns weiterhin," Die Zeit, Nr. 26, 24
June 1994; Pierre Pflimlin, "Zur europ„ischen Einigung
gibt es keine Alternative," Das Parlament, Vol. 44, Nr.
14, 8 April 1994.

64. "Mitterand urges unity in Europe," The Hartford
Courant, January 18, 1995, p. A9.

65. Hamilton, op.cit., p. 24.

[Page 67]

66. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

67. Ibid, p. 53.

68. W.R. Smyser, Germany and America: New Identities,
Fateful Rifts? Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p. 14.

69. Craig R. Whitney, "'Unvarnished Truth' Makes
Clinton's Envoy to Bonn 'Right Man at the Right Time,"
International Herald Tribune, 26 January 94.

70. "Deutschland an der Seite Amerikas," Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 March 94.

71. Richard N. Rosecrance, "Trading States in a New
Concert of Europe," in: Helga Haftendorn and Christian
Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p. 137.

72. Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation
with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2,
March/April 1994, p. 125.

73. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the
Pacific War, New York: Pantheon Books, 1986, p. 148.

[Page 68]

74. Ibid, p. 149.

75. Sunday Times, 23 June 1991, p. 17, cited in:
Dunbabin, op.cit, p. 181. The author also quotes from the
first draft of the 1988 American Trade Act, which stated
"...When trading with adversaries, like Japan." According
to Dunbabin, the phrase was dropped from the final text,
for obvious diplomatic reasons.

76. Guy F‚aux de la Croix, "Die Japan Politik
Frankreichts," in: Hanns W. Maull, ed., Japan und Europa:
Getrennte Welten? Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 1993, p.
312.

77. Of the 5.4 billion people on the planet, 828.1
million are in "high-income economies" with an average
GNP per capita of $22,160. In contrast, 3.2 billion
people live in "low-income economies" with per capita
GNPs of $390. World Bank, World Development Report 1994,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, Table 1. "Basic
Indicators," pp.162-163.

78. Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," Foreign
Affairs, November/December 1994, pp. 63-66.

[Page 69]

79. Ibid, p. 65.  

80. Albert Fishlow et al., Miracle or Design? Lessons
from the East Asian Experience, Washington, D.C.:
Overseas Development Council, 1994, p. 68.

81. Leonard Silk & Tom Kono, "Sayonara, Japan Inc.,"
Foreign Policy, Number 93, Winter 1993-94, p. 116.

82. See, for example, the World Bank's The East Asian
Miracle - Economic Growth and Public Policy, 1993;
Brigitte H. Schulz, ed., European Corporate Strategy
Toward the Asia-Pacific Region, Frankfurt: Nomura
Research Institute, 1993.

83. Paul Krugman, in a recent dissenting opinion, refers
to the NICs as "paper tigers" whose past performance will
not lead to a duplication of core economic strength. See
Krugman, op. cit., pp. 62-78.

84. James Fallows, Looking at the Sun, New York: Pantheon
Books, 1994, p. 225.

[Page 70]

85. William Dawkins points out that Asia has overtaken
the US as Japan's largest export destination in trade,
and investments to the area have also skyrocketed.
"Japan's economic influence in the rest of Asia has grown
so strong that its neighbours are now under pressure to
peg their currencies to the yen, rather than the dollar -
 the first step towards the formation of a yen bloc..."
"Rising value of yen encouraging Japanese firms to shift
to Asia," The Straits Times, July 20, 1994, p. 29.

86. Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan and the Strategic
Quadrangle," in: Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Strategic
Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in
East Asia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994,
p. 115.

87. See, for example, Albert Fishlow et al., Miracle or
Design? Lessons from the East Asian Experience,
Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1994.

88. J. M. Blaut, The Colonizer's Model of the World:
Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History, p. 81.

89. Ibid, p. 10.

[Page 71]

90. Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1989, p. vii. Variations on Amin's theme ;have
been numerous. Among the most compelling are Frantz,
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New Yorl: Grove Press,
1968; Edward W. Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage
Books, 1979, and Culture and Imperialism, New York:
Vintage Books, 1994.

91. It is this heritage of Eurocentrism which makes the
United States quintessentially a member of this project,
despite the fact that it has significant numbers of
citizens of non-European descent.

92. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, Nr. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-23.

93. Ibid, p. 23.

94. Eberhard Rondholz, "Abendl„ndliche Visionen: Alte
europ„ische Ordnungsvorstellungen, neu aufgelegt,"
Bl„tter f�r deutsche und internationale Politik, 7/94,
pp. 863-872.

95. Fanon, op. cit. p. 40.

[Page 72]

96. W.E.B.DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk, Greenwich,
CT.: Fawcett Publications, 1961, p. 23.

97. Quoted in Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice:
The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 226.

98. Eleanor Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East, New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1953, quoted in Lauren, Ibid, p.
227.

99. It should be pointed out that the issue of race, just
like that of gender, is largely ignored in traditional
scholarly works on international relations; i.e., the
leading paradigms are silent on this subject. Finding
specific empirical data is thus difficult, although the
importance of differences in the way in which people
relate to each other in cross-cultural negotiations, for
example, is now generally recognized.

100. Conference document No. 767, cited in Lauren, op.
cit. p. 92. For a more detailed discussed, see Chapter 3,
"Racial Equality Requested - and Rejected." American
hypocracy about the issue of race generally did not go

[Page 73]

unnoticed in the colonized world. For example, Afro-Asian
nations circulated a story about independence
celebrations in Ghana in 1957, when then-US Vice
President Richard Nixon turned to his black neighbor at
the dinner table and asked: How does it feel to be free?"
The reply: "I wouldn't know. I am from Alabama."
Recounted in Lauren, p. 228.

101. Karl Kautsky, "Der Weg zur Macht," in Patrick Goode,
ed., Karl Kautsky: Selected Political Writings, New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1983, p. 76.

102. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in
the Pacific War, New York: Pantheon Books, 1986,  passim.

103. For a lengthy discussion of the animosities between
Japan and its Asian neighbors, see Dower, op.cit.,
passim. 

104. Yoichi Funabashia, "The Asianization of Asia,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, November/December 1993,
p. 85.

105. Fallows, Looking..., op. cit., p. 250.

[Page 74]

106. Kinshore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way," Foreign
Affairs, January/February 1995, p. 103.

107. "Japan-bashing" is a vote-getter for American
politicians and US public opinion has long had a strong
anti-Japan bent. Recently, however, scholarly works have
added new fuel to this old fire. See, for example, George
Friedman and Meredith LeBard The Coming War with Japan,
which forecasts war with Japan at the beginning of the
next century; Edward N. Luttwak, "The Coming Global War
for Economic Power: There are no nice guys on the
battlefield of geo-economics," The National Times, March
1994, pp. 48-54; Karel Van Wolferen, The Enigma of
Japanese Power, London: Macmillan, 1989. Michael
Crichton's hugely successful novel Rising Sun, and the
resulting film of the same name, certainly added to the
image of Japan as a perilous enemy.

108. For an insightful critique of the global crisis of
liberalism, see Henrik Bischof, Die Krise der politischen
Philosophie des Westens und die internationale
Sicherheit, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1994
(unpublished manuscript). See also John Gray's review
article entitled "Does Democracy Have a Future?" The New
York Times Book Review, January 22, 1995, p. 1.

[Page 75]

109. This became clear with the Pentagon's "Operation
Desert Storm," whose ostensible reason was to oust the
Iraqi dictator, who was presented as a threat to
democracy. For a discussion of the importance of the
Third World in creating new enemy images, see Volker
Matthies, "Neues Feindbild Dritte Welt: Versch„rft sich
der Nord-S�d-Konflikt?" in: Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, B 25-26/91, 14 June 1991, pp. 3-11.

110. According to the Economic Policy Institute's The
State of Working America, real hourly wages for U.S. male
high school graduates declined 20.2 percent between 1973
and 1993. Doug Henwood, "A Decent Minimum," The Nation,
January 30, 1995, p. 113.

111. Lester C. Thurow, "The Fight over Competitiveness:
A Zero-Sum Debate?" Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994,
pp. 189.

112. Frederick Kempe, "Global Economic Integration Holds
Perils as Well as Opportunities, Historian Says," The
Wall Street Journal Europe, July 1-2, 1994. p. 8.

113. See the lengthy analysis of the November 1994
election by Susan Estrich, "The Last Victim," The New

[Page 76]

York Times Magazine, December 18, 1994, pp. 54-74. "The
new men's movement isn't about hating blacks or women or
wanting to reverse our national commitment to equality.
But it is about scapegoating, with men as the new
victims."(p.55) Estrich describes these sentiments:
"...with blacks and women getting jobs they don't
deserve, and illegal immigrants taking jobs and
collecting welfare, it's a wonder a white man can ever
make ends meet."(p. 54)

114. Jesse Helms, for example, is one of the most
powerful senators and, as a result of his party's sweep
in the elections, has just become chairman of the
powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Helms, a
fundamentalist Christian with very limited formal
education, is a right-wing ideologue who makes no secret
of his racist and xenophobic views. As reported by Tim
Weiner, "All his life, he has passionately opposed the
civil rights movement, Federal aid to education,
environmental projects.....Over time, his list of pet
hates has grown to include foreign treaties, foreign aid,
many foreign countries and most of the striped-pants
experts at the State Department." "Man With His Own
Foreign Policy," The New York Times, December 7, 1994, p.
A10.

[Page 77]

115. "Clinton Will Seek Spending To Curb Aliens, Aides
Say," The New York Times, January 22, 1995, p. 1.

116. "Cuomo speaks critically of GOP agenda," The
Hartford Courant, December 17, 1994, p. A4.

117. Ashley Dunn, "In California, the Numbers Add Up to
Anxiety," The New York Times, October 30, 1994, p. 5:
"The economy is down and resentment of the immigrant
influx is up." See also "Immigration issue defines
California race," USA Today, 30 September 1994, p. 4A. As
pointed out in this article, although non-Hispanic whites
make up only 54% of California's population, they have a
tremendous edge in the polls, since nearly 80% of them
have voted in past elections, compared to less than 10%
for all other ethnic groups in the state. Thus, while
California is a multi-ethnic state, its politics can be
described as largely reflecting the will of the majority
of the white segment of the population.

118. Tim Golden, "Mexican Chief Urges Talks on Freer Flow
of Migrants," The New York Times, November 14, 1994, p.
A11.

[Page 78]

119. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell
Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life,
New York: Free Press, 1994. The book has proven to be a
financial bonanza for its publisher, the Free Press,
which is now "rolling in money." This brand of ultra-
conservatism has clearly become big business in America.
See "Adam Bellow Seizes The Day," The Talk of the Town,
The New Yorker, January 16, 1995, p. 28.

120. Alan Ryan, "Apocalypse Now?" The New York Review of
Books, Vol. XLI, Number 19, November 17, 1994, pp. 7-11.
See also Charles Lane, "The Tainted Sources of `The Bell
Curve'," The New York Review of Books, Vol. XLI, Number
20, December 1, 1994, pp. 14-19. Lane traces the sources
used in The Bell Curve to an international network of
scholars committed to proving and protecting the
superiority of the White race, ranging from Great Britain
to the US to Canada to South Africa.

121. Herman M. Schwartz, States Versus Markets: History,
Geography, and the Development of the International
Political Economy, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p.
4.

[Page 79]

122. James Joll, The Origins of The First World War, 2nd
ed., London and New York: Longman, 1992, p. 164.

123. See, for example, David E. Sanger, "War. Peace. Aid.
All Issues are Trade Issues," The New York Times Week in
Review, January 15, 1995, p. 1. Sanger reports former
Treasury Lloyd Bentsen as saying: "Everyone's been saying
for a long time that foreign policy is becoming economic,
but like everything it's taken a while for the message to
sink in around here." The article outlines the
increasingly aggressive American policy in pursuit of
foreign markets. Argues Sanger: "The risk, of course, is
that relentless pressure to buy, buy, buy American
undercuts alliances and breeds resentments."

124. Karl Kaiser, "Das vereinigte Deutschland in der
internationalen Politik," in: Karl Kaiser and Hanns W.
Maull, eds., Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, Munich:
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994, p. 12.