_Journal of World-Systems Research_, 1995, Volume 1, Number 15
http://jwsr.ucr.edu/
ISSN 1076-156X
Hegemony and Bifurcation Points in World History*
Terry Boswell
Department of Sociology
Emory University
Atlanta GA 30322 USA
e-mail: tbos@ssmain.ss.emory.edu
Copyright (c) 1995 Terry Boswell
*I would like to acknowledge comments from John Boli, Christopher
Chase-Dunn, Michael Tien Lung Liu, Kristen Marsh, Steve Miner and
Joya Misra.
(c) Copyright 1995, Terry Boswell
[Page 1]
ABSTRACT
Examination of the rise and fall of hegemons over the last
500 years reveals that each lasts about 100 years, with
another 100 year period between hegemons that is
characterized by rough balance among shifting powers and
frequent major wars. Can the future differ from the long
established pattern? Theories that causally link hegemony
to uneven development succeed in explaining the perennial
rise and fall of world leaders, but fail to explain the
persistence of a leader who has become hegemonic. The
explanation given here is the establishment of institutional
inertia in the world order, which slows the diffusion of
innovations, but also restrains the adoption of subsequent
changes. An analytic model describes the cycle of hegemony
as the historically and politically contingent interaction
of long terms trends in the world-system. Recently,
hegemony has come into interaction with the cumulative
trends of market commodification, decolonization, and
democratization. This has produced a rise in independent
nations and decline of imperial states worldwide. In the
conclusion, we speculate on how these new developments make
possible such events as a multi-state hegemony, a shared
world polity, and a democratic world government.
[Page 2]
HEGEMONY AND BIFURCATION POINTS IN WORLD HISTORY
The cycle of hegemony has repeated itself three times
since 1492, giving the world a Dutch, British, and now
declining US hegemonies. Theoretical models (Chase-Dunn and
Rubinson 1977; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1979), historical
narratives (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989; Kennedy 1989), and
statistical analyses (Modelski and Thompson 1988; Boswell
and Sweat 1991) portray the cycle of hegemony as a fixed
dynamic inherent to the world-system. Can we expect the
future to be any different?
To understand the future of hegemony, we need first to
build a model of how hegemony has developed. The model
developed here, based on a synthesis of past research,
explains the cyclic nature of world leadership as resulting
from the interaction of three systemic trends --- interstate
political competition, world market integration, and uneven
economic development. A world leader becomes hegemonic when
the institutional order it enforces builds an inertia into
the otherwise chaotic movement of the system. Hegemony is a
period of relative peace and order in a system that is
inherently competitive, dynamic and uneven.
[Page 3]
Theories, models, tables and statistics are put
together here to tell where we have been, and if nothing
changed, where we would be going. In the final section, I
turn to recent developments that offer potentials for
changing the system. A significant change has already taken
place, one little noticed in previous theories because its
source are trends not previously important to understanding
hegemony. Those trends are proletarianization,
democratization, and decolonization, the cumulative effects
of which are weighing on the usual machinations of the
capitalist world-system. The interaction of these trends
with existing ones, which is only recently occurring, has
the potential to fundamentally alter the cycle.
A Synthesis of Systemic Theories
There are two major systemic theories of the rise and fall
of world dominating powers, long cycle theory of world
leaders (Modelski and Thompson 1988, forthcoming) and world-
economy theory of hegemony (Wallerstein 1979, 1980, 1984,
1989; Chase-Dunn 1989, and Rubinson 1977). In previous
research comparing world leaders and hegemonies, I have
emphasized the differences in theories (Boswell and Sweat
[Page 4]
1991; Misra and Boswell 1992). Recent developments, both
theoretical and empirical, however have brought the theories
closer together in terms of causal arguments. What were
competing theories can now be reformulated, I argue, as
complementary arguments in a synthesis of approaches.
Hegemony refers to a state's preponderance over the
world-economy. What we find historically is a series of
"revolutions" in production, which cluster geographically.
The mercantile revolution was centered in the Netherlands;
the industrial revolution was concentrated in Britain, and
mass assembly line production, the so-called second
industrial revolution, was centered in the US.
In Modelski and Thompson's original version of long
cycle theory (1988), world leaders are states that emerge
from a global war with an overwhelming military advantage
(over 50% of total sea power). This preponderance of
naval power enables leaders to define and defend the world
order. However, in their forthcoming work, they explain
that the source of leadership is economic. States rise
because they rule a country with a concentration of leading
economic sectors. Leading sectors also play a central role
in many world-economy approaches to hegemony, providing a
causal link between theories.
[Page 5]
Modelski and Thompson (forthcoming) methodically lay
out over a 500 year period the major innovations, the
geographic concentrations of leading economic sectors, and
the consequential rise and fall of world leaders. A cluster
of major innovations that are both organizational and
technical changes can cause a growth spurt in a sector of
the economy, the diffusion of which lifts the entire system
into a K-wave expansion for the next 20-30 years. K-waves,
or long waves, are extended periods of expansion and
stagnation, lasting about 40-60 years altogether. The
expansion is caused by a cluster of basic innovations that
create a new leading sector; stagnation ensues when the
innovations are widely diffused and markets for new
applications are saturated. The search for and
implementation of innovative methods occurs during the
stagnant phase, when traditional methods are faltering.(1)
The point for understanding hegemony is that it is now
agreed that the geographic concentration of leading sectors
is the motor that drives both cycles of world leadership and
of hegemony.
In world-economy theory, the rise and fall of states
results from uneven economic development. There are two
interacting yet contradictory principles of uneven
[Page 6]
development, the *advantages of backwardness* and the
*multiplier effect* of resource expansion, that guide the
mobility of economic innovation and thus the rise and
decline on states.(2) First, the "advantage of backwardness"
is such that the clustering of economic innovations occurs
most often and most profitably in areas that were somewhat
left out of the previous application of an innovation in
production. As elaborated below, this is due to
institutional inertia and high fixed investment in the
previously leading sectors. As a result, there is a
pressure or tendency for the next 'revolution' in production
to be concentrated somewhere else, giving us a mobile
pattern of rise and decline. At the same time, however, an
innovation driven expansion in one sector has a multiplier
effect on the rest of the economy, generating resources for
further development. One long term expansion will lay down
the infrastructure and provide the resources for the next.
As a result, we historically find that the geographic clustering
of k-wave expansions occurs in pairs. Why only pairs? By
the time of the second expansion, institutional inertia and
the depreciation costs of aging infrastructure have
cumulated to the extent that the advantages of backwardness
outweigh the benefits of prior resource expansion.
[Page 7]
Table 1 combines world-system theory with the new long cycle
approach to leading sectors, in order to distill the key set
of causal factors from the detailed historical narratives in
these and related studies (see tabular sources). The table
provides a list of economic long waves by type and price
measure, along with associated leading economic sectors and
selected accumulation innovations developed during a long
stagnation, where the subsequent economic expansion was
concentrated, and consequently, what states became world
leaders and hegemonies.
The pattern of paired geographic concentration of k-
waves producing a world leader, first described by Modelski
and Thompson (forthcoming), can clearly be found in Table 1.
In the first pair, there is a shift from Portugal to a
shared concentration with neighboring Spain. There was also
a prior K-wave (ca. 1480s) centered in Portugal, according
to Modelski and Thompson (forthcoming), which was fueled by
expansion in N. Africa and the exploitation of Guinea gold.
Afterward, the pattern is largely one where the first wave
in the pair tends to be less concentrated, including 2-3
countries, while the more exclusive second wave produces a
world leader among the competitors.
In the second pair, a general expansion in the Low
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Countries becomes centered in the Netherlands in the second
wave; the third pair goes from the Americas in general to
primarily English colonies; the fourth pair has both waves
centered in the U.K., but industrialization was nearly as high
in France during the first wave; the fifth pair is also both
centered in the U.S., but again, during the first wave the U.S.
is not far ahead of Germany in concentration; and finally, what
is the beginning of the 6th pair sees a concentration led by both
Japan and the US.
Exceptions are possible, such as the repeating British
leadership, once mainly due to its colonial success, and the
second time from being the center of the industrial revolution.
Also, the last wave may be the least concentrated development of
new sectors. The development of information industries spans
nearly all of the core, making the major distinction between
core and periphery, rather than between core states each with
its own imperially-associated colonial periphery.
[Page 9]
Table 1. Economic Sources of World Leadership and Hegemony:
K-Waves, Leading Sectors, and Concentrations: 1495-1974
____________________________________________________________
K-Wave Price Leading Sectors/ Geographic World Leaders/
Period Change Innovations Concentration Hegemonies
1496-S 2.73 Direct Spice Trade Portugal
1509-E 2.80 Exploration Voyages
1529-S -2.18 American Silver Spain/ Portugal 1517-
1539-E 3.25 Colonial Conquests Portugal 1541
#Hapsburgs 1526-
1559-S 3.28* Baltic Trade Low 1556
1575-E 2.95* "fluyt" ships Countries
#(Spain 1594-7)
1595-S -0.75 Asian Trade Neth. United 1609-
1621-E 0.68 East India Co. Neth. 1635
United 1621-
1650-S -0.59 Atlantic Trade American Neth. 1655
1689-E -0.28 Slave Plantations Colonies
1720-S 0.53* Colonial Trades English United 1714-
1747-E 1.09 Colonial Expansion Colonies Kingdom 1739
1762-S 0.52 Cotton Textiles United
1790-E 3.52 Industrialization Kingdom
(France)
1814-S -0.55 Railroads United United 1816-
1848-E 0.81 Wage/Factory System Kingdom Kingdom 1849
United 1850-
1872-S -1.95 Steel; Chemicals United Kingdom 1873
1893-E 2.06 Mass Production States
(Germany)
1917-S -3.46 Autos; Air; Electric United
1940-E 4.40 Multi-Corporation States U. S. 1945-1974
U. S. 1945-1974
1968-S n.a. Information Industry Japan/
Flexible Special- U.S. (?)
ization
____________________________________________________________
Key: Type of economic period: E = Expansion period;
S = Stagnation period;
* The direction of the annual average price change does not
correspond with the type of wave. In general, the 18th
century has seen the least history and analysis of world-
systemic dynamics.
# The United Hapsburgs was an attempted imperial/Catholic
world polity rather than an hegemony. It was based more on
imperial coercive dominance and cultural imposition than on
hegemonic economic dependence and cultural isomorphism.
After the redivision of the Hapsburg domains, Spain managed
a relative sea power superiority above 50%, but it was
too brief to constitute systemic leadership.
Sources: Long Waves: Goldstein (1988); Price Change: percent annual
average change during the period for in all 26 price series from 9
core countries found in Goldstein (1985, Appendix I p.436-7);
Leading sectors: Modelski and Thompson (forthcoming), Rostow (1978)
[American silver added based on Misra and Boswell 1992]. The
timing of waves and sectors differs frequently but usually in small
amounts and is variable at the margins in any case. Accumulation
Innovations: Boswell (1987, see his tabular citations); additions
extrapolated from Modelski and Thompson (forthcoming) and Misra and
Boswell 1992. World leaders, periods of peak concentration only:
Modelski and Thompson (forthcoming); Hegemony, mature periods only:
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1979), with adjustments prior to 1700 from
Misra and Boswell (1992). See also Kann 1974; Holsti 1991.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Page 10]
The convergence in causal arguments has eliminated some of
the distinction in the two theories, but it has opened the
possibility of combining the two theories into a new synthesis. My
intent is not simply to merge one theory into the other; leaders
and hegemonies are still distinct categories.(3) Rather, I seek to
explain the relationship between economic and military dominance.
To do so, we turn that relationship into a variable.
Historically, it is possible to have military leaders that are not
hegemonies. All hegemonies have also been leaders, with the sole
exception of the United Hapsburgs, whose dominance was more
coercive and imperial than hegemonic precisely because they were
not economic innovators.
The key question is: When does a world leader translate
its military dominance into a lasting economic hegemony? Two
consecutive k-wave concentrations appear to be necessary for
producing the resources for a state to become a world leader
(Modelski and Thompson forthcoming). Generally, leaders
become hegemonic during the expansion phase of the second
wave, such that world leadership is necessary, although not
sufficient, for hegemony. A state may have dominant sea
power and even a concentration of leading sectors, but not
translate it into hegemony over the world economy. Two
world leaders listed in Table 1, Portugal in 1517-41 and
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Britain in 1714-39, had the dominant navy and a
concentration of the most important economic sectors, but
were never hegemonic over the entire system.(4)
To address the question of turning leadership into
hegemony one needs to explain why, once established,
hegemony lasts for such extended periods (averaging around
50 years). That is, most theories and histories of hegemony
are about rise and fall, but they leave out persistence in
between, both the staying power of a hegemon and the
persistence of a rough balance after a hegemon has fallen.
A theory of institutional inertia is developed here, which
claims, following the physical analogy, that once a hegemon
is ensconced, it tends to stay dominant over the system, or
if no hegemon is present, that the system will stay in a
rough balance. If the balance is shifted in some direction,
however, it will trend in that direction until met by an
opposing force. Staying with the physical analogy, I label
the points where a trend in hegemony shifts from one
direction to another "bifurcation points."(5)
[Page 12]
The Political Economy of Institutional Inertia
While leaders may contend for hegemony, the military
outcomes of that contention, and the institutionalization of
a subsequent peace, are necessary for success. In Table 2,
one finds again the list of waves, world leaders and world
hegemonies, with the rise and fall phases of the hegemonic
cycle added (i.e., ascent, victory, maturity, and decline).
We also now find the associated global wars and world
orders. Global wars are those major conflicts within the
core in which the issue of hegemony is at stake (Levy 1985).
Although wars in the core are unlikely when a country is
fully hegemonic, major wars are more likely during a K-wave
expansion when countries have the resources for a lengthy
and expensive war (Boswell and Sweat 1988). As such, those
global wars that lead to a hegemony are to some extent
paired with the relevant k-waves, but there is no set
pattern found in all cases.(6)
"World orders" are the agreed upon and normative rules
of international relations, the major principles of which
are represented in a treaty or pact among the major core
powers (Holsti 1992). A related term, "world polity," is used
by the institutionalist branch of world-system studies for a
[Page 13]
similar concept (Meyer 1987; Thomas et. al. 1987; Boli
1994). It is applied here only to the Hapsburg/Catholic
case. Both concepts refer to the rules, norms, and
organizations in international relations that emerge through
interaction, but which may be infused by a hegemon whose
interests are served by compliance with the order.
The concepts of world order and polity differ in
emphasis, however, and the contrast is useful for explaining
both. World polity has a greater emphasis on shared culture
and its institutionalization in international organizations
(both governmental IGOs and nongovernmental INGOs), while
world order has a greater realist emphasis on formal
agreements of imposed or common geopolitical interests, in
which the world order is a public good. A world polity
implies shared values that may or may not correspond with
economic interests, and which are enforced through
international organizations that have at least some coercive
power. A world order implies common economic interests that
may or may not correspond to individual cultural values,
and which are followed out of self-interest with little
external enforcement. Although the difference between
consensual and instrumental agreement is only one of
emphasis, the difference is occasionally useful, such as
[Page 14]
distinguishing the Catholic world polity of 16th century
from the world order of realpolitik between sovereign states
in the 17th century. In the concluding chapter, the
distinction returns as we speculate on whether a new
world polity (such as the World Trade Organization) is
replacing the declining world order of American hegemony and
whether it can do it without a global war.
Table 2: Political Sources of Hegemony: K-Waves, World
Leaders, Hegemony, Global Wars and World Orders:
1495-1974
K-Wave World Hegemonic Global Wars
Period Leader Cycle World Order
Phases
1496-S 1492-A Italian Wars (1494-1517/25)
1509-E 1517 1519-V #Catholic Polity, 1519
Portugal
1529-S 1541 1526-M
1539-E #Hapsburgs
1559-S 1556-D
1575-E #(Spain 1575-A Dutch Indep./Armada (1585-
1594-7) -1609)
1595-S 1609 1609-V
1621-E U.N. 1621-M Thirty Years War (1618-1648)
1635 Netherlands Interstate Sovereignty, 1648
1650-S 1655-D War of Louis XIV (1672-78)
1689-E 1667-C League of Augsburg (1688-97)
1714 Spanish Succession (1701-13)
1720-S U.K. Balance of Power, 1714
1747-E 1739 Jenkins Ear/Austrian Suc.
(1739-1748)
1762-S Seven Years' War (1755-1763)
1790-E 1789-A Rev. Wars/Napoleonic (1792-
U.K. -1815)
1814-S 1816 1815-V Concert of Europe, 1815
1848-E 1849 1850-M
U. Kingdom
1872-S 1873-D
1893-E 1897-A
The Great War (WWI) (1914-18)
1917-S 1918-V League of Nations, 1918
1940-E 1945 1945-M World War II (1939-1945)
U.S. U. States NATO/United Nations, 1945
1968-S 1974 1974-D
1990s-E? World Trade Org. / INGOs?
____________________________________________________________
Key: Type of economic period E = Expansion period
S = Stagnation period
Hegemon Phase of hegemon
U.H. = United Hapsburgs* A = ascent
U.N. = United Netherlands V = victory
U.K. = United Kingdom M = maturity
U.S. = United States D = decline
C = competitive
# The United Hapsburgs was an attempted imperial/
Catholic world polity rather than an hegemony. It was based
more on imperial coercive dominance and cultural imposition
than on hegemonic economic dependence and cultural
isomorphism. After the redivision of the Hapsburg domains,
Spain managed a relative sea power superiority above 50%,
but it was too brief to constitute systemic leadership.
Sources:
Long Waves: Goldstein (1988). World leaders: Modelski and
Thompson (forthcoming). Hegemony: Hopkins and Wallerstein
(1979) >1700; <1700, Misra and Boswell (1992). Global Wars:
Levy (1985), Italian wars from Modelski and Thompson (1988).
World Orders: Holsti (1991), except for 1516.
-------------------------------------------------------------
[Page 15]
Previous research has yet to offer a theory for why some
world leaders expanded to a point where they became hegemonic,
while others passed comparatively quickly. Why does
hegemony last? Or from the opposite point of view, what
prevents others from quickly emulating the innovations of
the world leader, thus restoring a rough balance in a short
time? In fact, the principle of uneven development suggests
that others will emulate the innovators, and that those who
are somewhat behind have the advantage -- this is what drives
hegemonic decline. We are left with a theoretical model that
expects the periodic rise of leaders, but also expects that
they should soon decline with a shift in economic
concentration someplace else. The history of the system
supports this model, -- some leaders fade without becoming
hegemonies -- but the history also tells us that for long
periods something prevents the equalizing process from
working, and instead we get a persistent hegemony.
Interactions in the modern world-system are regulated
by two subsystems, a world market of competing producers and
an interstate system of competing polities. In a market, a
pattern of short term fluctuations but long term equilibrium
is unexceptional. To the extent that a market is
competitive, then economic actors will shift constantly for
[Page 16]
lower costs and higher profits. An innovation in the system
will give the innovator an advantage, which can be a huge
advantage, but which should be short lived. Long periods of
rough balance among producers, with shifts in economic
dominance every few years, are thus relatively easy to
explain from the point of view of market economics. For
instance, we entered a period of rough balance in the 1980s
and 90s in which the US still has the largest share of the
world economy, but is no longer hegemonic. Models of
dynamism and organization have shifted during this time
between Germany, Japan, the European Union, and China, but
none has broached the position of world leader and, while all
are competitors, none is yet the obvious heir apparent. As
we become familiar with a parade of trend-setters over an
enduring rough equilibrium in the last 20 years, the
previous stability of American hegemony appears ever more
remarkable, as well as antiquated. We can guess about which
states best fit the emerging trends in the system, and I
will make my guess in the conclusion, but the main point is
that we have entered a period of volatility around a rough
balance and growing equality among core states.
Looking only at market relations makes a persistent
hegemony a disturbing paradox of inertia in an inherently
[Page 17]
dynamic system. Inertia enters the system through politics.
That is, the economic actors at the global level are firms
and states with institutional and coercive sources of
resource accumulation, rather than just market ones.
Firms invest capital and employ labor for lengthy
projects that gain a return only over the long term
(mortgages easily run 40 years, for instance). More
importantly, once a firm has invested heavily in a
production process, it has a strong vested interest
(literally) in maintenance of the conditions under which
that investment is profitable. Employing an accumulation
innovation that could kick off a new wave of expansion
requires that competing firms throughout a country and then
the world make a sequence of major investments in a similar
process or technology.
Organizational isomorphism drives all these firms to adopt
similar institutional structures, even for those firms that do not
directly benefit from the innovation but must interact with the
ones that do. As a result, capitalist owners of firms have a
common source for action despite lacking intentional coordination.
These interests and actions are institutionalized in the form of
rules and patterns of resource allocation that are relatively
independent from the life cycle of owners. A standard
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finding in organizational sociology is that the larger and
more bureaucratic a firm, the more resistent it is to
change.
Institutional inertia also works in the opposite
direction, against further innovation. In global terms, the
institutions designed to implement accumulation innovations
then become impediments to further innovation. The greater
the concentration of leading sectors, the longer it takes
for innovations to diffuse, but also, the greater the
impediments to further innovation. Capitalist development is
always uneven, flowing fastest where unhindered by
institutional entrenchment. The entrenchment that slows
decline also impedes innovative growth.
Turning to the interstate system, states are both
facilitators of firm actions and economic actors in their
own right. States have an institutionalized interest in
maintaining a "business climate" of high profitability, and
unlike firms, they have administrative and coercive
resources to realize their interests. Without further
elaboration of organization theory, it should be apparent
that administrative and coercive allocation of resources
will be much more inertia laden than market allocation.
States respond to the world market and global
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interdependence with attempts to control exchanges and
decide disputes to their benefit (including the benefit of
their internal economic elites). Coercive action for states
includes war and imperialism, but also the less flashy forms
such as embargoes, threats, taxes and tariffs. Political
isomorphism, backed by coercion as well as coordination,
remains in force until it is met by a countervailing power.
Whether a world order lasts then depends on how much it
contradicts the interests of particular core states, versus
how much it serves their common interests. Sovereignty, for
instance, despite being ill-defined and elusive, has since
1648 been the groundwork premise of all subsequent world
orders for core states, and since 1960, for all states.
Our histories of hegemony point out that rise
corresponds with global war, especially where the hegemon is
relatively insulated from the wartime destruction that
undermines its competitors. Global war in this capacity is
both a sifter, distinguishing among competitors for what in
the short run are noneconomic reasons, and an accelerator,
hastening the bifurcation from a rough balance to an
oscillation between balance and leadership. The oscillation
settles into hegemony if the world leader can impose a
lasting world order.
[Page 20]
The treaty that marks the initiation of a new world order is
perhaps the best single indicator that a bifurcation in
international relations has occurred. The terms of the treaty
itself are less important than the fact that, because a world
leader has emerged from the global war with overwhelming military
and economic power, a new world order will be enforced. In so
doing, the leader reconfigures the patterns of exchange and
security to its benefit, setting up the potential requirements for
hegemony. The military capacity of a hegemon is thus a critical
determinant of its staying power, such as the protection of
global shipping lines described by Modelski and Thompson
(forthcoming, 1988). However, this too is a double edged
sword. Military over-extension is a prime source of economic
decline, as described in Kennedy's account (1989).
The translation of world leadership into hegemony thus
results from the conjuncture of world leadership with two
interrelated but distinct events: a global war that destroys
competitors and a new world order in which the rules, norms
and institutions are skewed such that the leader's interests
are the common interest. If hegemony is achieved, its length
depends on the size and balance of institutional inertia,
such as the state's military reach and the balance of
protecting global transactions versus military over-
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extension. As decline results from the cumulative effect of
institutional inertia, it is essentially inevitable. And as
development is uneven, a cycle of world leaders is also
essentially inherent to the system (as it has been working).
The translation of leadership into hegemony, however, is
conjunctural and political. The cycle of hegemony is
neither necessary nor set in its periodicity. From a
different point of view, even with the system operating
normally, change is possible and its source is political.
Trends, Interactions and Cycles
At times the theory seems lost in the particular
histories, or the differences in theories seem to meld away
in the historical accounts. The solution to such ambiguity
is to construct an analytical model of cause and effect.
The model developed here combines elements of long cycle
and world-economy approaches into a unified theory. In this
model, cycles are explained as the interaction of trends.
As discussed above, the cycle of hegemony and war results
from the interaction of three long term trends: state
formation, economic interdependence, and uneven development.
In Figure 1, the causal pathways for each trend, their
[Page 22]
interactions and resulting cycles are displayed as a formal
analytic model. Going across the rows, interstate
competition drives state formation as polities are forced to
develop militarized states to compete with other states.
The growing integration of the world economy brings new
societies into competition, and requires that all global
actors have recognizable and even similar institutions to
enable interaction. The combination of integration and
uneven development results in an unequal interdependence, in
which the core states regulate exchange with peripheral ones
through imperial means. Imperialism has been the political
cement between core and periphery.
Figure 1. Hegemonic Cycle resulting from the Interaction of
Global Trends
----------------------------------------------------------------
Trends Interactions Cycles
interstate -> state formation------>global
competition ^ \ / war \
| >imperialism | > world order
world market | / v / \
integration-> interdependency-> world leader---> HEGEMONY
^ ^ ^ /
| | | /
uneven development -----> K-waves -> shifting concentration
---->decolonization imperialism
/ ^ \
/ | \
HEGEMONY --> peace/protection-->overextension-->DECLINE
\ | /
\ v /
----> institutional --> shifting concentration
inertia
------------------------------------------------------------------
[Page 23]
Conflicts over imperial spheres lead to wars, which
become major wars when a long K-wave expansion provides the
resources, and then become global wars when the shifting
economic balance creates a multi-polarity among the core states.
A world leader emerges from the global war to forge a new
world order for regulating international relations and
distributing imperial obligations. If competitors are
largely devastated by the war, and if the new world order
skews relations so that expansion of the leader is in the
common good of most core states, then during the next
economic expansion leadership is translated into hegemony
over the system. The "ifs" are the historically contingent
institutional and political factors.
The trends continue, however, and the hegemon's
lifespan is limited. Its resilience depends in particular
on preventing the world order from breaking back down into
imperial regulation of competing spheres. It thus benefits
from decolonization of competing empires (but not its own).
Maintaining the world order also requires the hegemon to
extend its military reach over long distance transactions.
However, other traders benefit from the world order without
paying the military costs, leading eventually to an over-
extension by the hegemon. Decline sets in when the lead
[Page 24]
shifts to a new economic sector, but the over-extended
hegemon is entrenched in decaying industries.
The analytical model in Figure 1 is intended to explain
the systemic causal processes involved in hegemony that are
common to all cases. A partial statistical analysis of the
model using time-series regression is presented in the
appendix.
Theoretical models refine historical processes
into their necessary and sufficient causes. Historical
explanations for the rise or fall of each hegemon also
include a great mass of particular history, contingent
events, and random occurrence -- the highlights of which are
summarized in Tables 1 and 2. As such, models lose the
narrative history that is often important for full
understanding of the causal processes and for making
convincing arguments in selecting one process over
contenders. On the other hand, lack of analytical rigor
allows historical explanations to ooze into unique
particularities, preventing the synthesis proposed here. A
solution is to combine analytical and narrative approaches.
Space prevents a new interpretive narration here, for which
we have substituted the historical outlines in tables one
and two. Readers can also turn to a multitude of explicitly
[Page 25]
historical accounts of each country. The model, tables,
theory and discussion takes us up through the maturation of
American hegemony in the post-war period. But what is next?
The Future of Hegemony
Academics are often reluctant to speculate or predict;
our primary job is to explain and educate. Extrapolations from
explanations of what happened before leads to a mechanical
notion of history that belies the importance of new or
cumulative developments. Also, while theories may explain
when social conflicts or contingent actions can have more or
less influence on the course of history, their outcome
cannot be entirely predicted by definition.
World-system theory, for instance, suggests a greater
volatility during periods of economic stagnation and when a
hegemony is absent. Having entered such a period, the value to
social movements of making predictions about structural
developments increases dramatically. A good example is the
revolutions of 1989, which world-system theory could have
predicted, and which some hinted at but failed to
proclaim.(7) With that license, I will make two types of
speculations, one based on a simple, even mechanical
[Page 26]
repetition of the cycle, following mainly the US example,
and a contrasting second one that emphasizes new
developments and possible alternatives.
A repetition of the cycle would include the following
10 steps (to which are added some speculative dates):
1. (1995-2010s) The US will continue its relative
decline while the next K-wave expansion, perhaps
beginning now, is concentrated in competing powers;
2. (2010s-20s) Interdependence yet imperial rivalry
among a multipolar core leads to anarchic political
conflicts, one of which spirals into a global war
among combatants with ample military resources;
3. (2020s) Peace resumes when resources, including
human ones, are exhausted, except for those of a
relatively unscathed world leader who emerges with
a preponderance of military power;
4. (2010s-30s) War costs produce inflation despite
declines in employment, which along with market
saturation for past leading economic sectors, leads
to a stagnant and erratic economy;
[Page 27]
5. (2030s-70s) Innovation jumps the system into a
renewed K-wave expansion, concentrated in the world
leader;
6. (2030s-40s) Resources are again available for a
political conflict to become a global war, if the
leader cannot enforce the world order;
7. (2040s) The victorious combatants agree to a common
world order to govern global transactions, with
enforcement and benefits falling first to the world
leader;
8. (2040s-60s) Dependence on and institutionalization
of the world order makes the leader into a hegemon over
the system, who manages over a "golden age" of peace and
prosperity;
9. (2070s-2090s) The k-wave economic expansion comes to an
end due to emulation of innovations, infrastructual
decline, and saturation of easy markets leads to a long
stagnation;
[Page 28]
10. (2080s-2090s) The hegemon declines relative to
rising competitors, who free-ride on the hegemon's
enforcement of the world order and whose institutions are
not fettered by concentration in the now relatively
declining economic sectors -- bringing us back to #1.
While there will be unforseen variations and particular
events, three past hegemonies have followed a version of
these ten steps. The systemic trends in Figure 1 that
produced the cycle have not diminished in importance or
intensity. If there is an alternative future, it will have
to come from trends, processes or events that have not
heretofore been crucial in determining the history of global
wars and world leaders. Such trends exist in the form of
proletarianization, democratization and decolonization,
which have grown dramatically in importance over the last 50
years.
The Rise of Nations and Decline of States
These trends originate with the cumulative expansion of
commodification -- the transformation of all relations into
monetized market exchanges. The most important form of
[Page 29]
commodification has been proletarianization, the making of
labor relations into wage relations. Commodification in
interaction with state formation has led to the rise in the
number of sovereign nations, and since WWII, the decline in
size and imperial reach of states. In Figure 2, we revise
the model displayed above in Figure 1 to include relatively
recent changes in the cycle of hegemony and possible future
changes. The trends listed in Figure 1 are repeated at the
bottom of the new figure, which adds the new trends at the
top and possible future developments to the far right (in
brackets [] ).
The key differences with the past, as displayed in
Figure 2, are the following: abolition of colonization,
disassembling of imperial multinational states,
proliferation of nation states, and democratization of
states in the core and much of the semi-periphery. Huge
imperial states have broken into literally hundreds of
nations: the British Empire broke apart in a series of
steps in the 1940s and 50s, the French Empire ended in the
1960s; Portuguese in the 70s, and the Soviet Union unraveled
in the 1990s. As a result, imperial regulation of
international exchange has been replaced with a "world
polity" regulation. More precisely, the world order of
[Page 30]
sovereign nation-states in the core has spread to the
entire decolonized periphery. Order has been turned into
the early stages of world polity by the massive
proliferation of international organizations and the growing
standardization of global exchanges (see Boli 1994 on the
growth of the world polity).
This in turn opens the possibility of alternative paths
to hegemony, and even of a transformation of the system to
include a world government. Of course, it is also possible,
and perhaps probable, that these changes are temporary, and
that the past cycle of imperialism, hegemony and war will
again repeat itself in devastating fashion. The possibilities of
changing the system are slim, but there are nonetheless
greater possibilities now than in the previous century. We
have reached a bifurcation point in world history.
Let us explore the trends and changes by tracing them
in Figure 2, then return to the question of alternatives and
possibilities. This figure includes the trends presented
earlier and adds new developments.
The additions start with commodification, which, like the
other trends of the world-economy, results from the expanding
accumulation process inherent to capitalism. The expansion of
[Page 31]
market relations overlaps with all the other trends, and indeed
one could consider commodification and world integration to be
inseparable. However, commodification has particular effects that
are at least analytically useful to consider independently.
Proletarianization, or the commodification of labor relations
into wage labor, is the most important outcome. While labor
markets have long existed, the proletariat has only included
the bulk of the core population since the 19th century and
it is yet to be the majority in the periphery.
Another result of commodification is individualism.
This is not an automatic outcome. Rather, as Max Weber
lamented, monetized markets undermine traditional authority,
including religious, familial, nobility, caste, ethnic, and
other nonpecuniary ties. What is left is the instrumental
interactions of individuals. Thus commodification does not
directly encourage individualism; instead, it undermines any
nonmarket relationship between individuals.
[Page 32]
=========================================================
Figure 2. World Polity resulting from the Interaction of
Global Trends and the Possibility of a Democratic World
Government.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Trends Interactions Cycles [Future Transformation]
______________________________________________________________
individualism ---> democratization ---------\
commodification < | >[WORLD
proletarianization *-> revolutionary movements/ DEMO-
| | | | CRACY]
v v | | ^
HEGEMONY *---------> decolonization | | |
^ | | | |
| | | | |
interstate -> state formation | | | |
competition ^ \ v v \ |
| >nation states---->[world polity] |
world market | / \ / \ [MULTI- |
integration-> interdependency-> [multi-states]--> STATE |
^ ^ ^ / HEGEMONY]
| | | /
uneven development -----> K-waves -> shifting balance
*----> Indicates effects of k-waves are also important,
which cannot be graphed here.
============================================================
[Page 33]
Taken together, individualism undermines traditional
authority, while proletarianization fosters a class with a
common interest in democracy and a growing size and resource
mobilization capable of implementing it through
revolutionary movements (Boswell and Dixon 1993, 1990). An
impressive recent study by Ruschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens (1992) thoroughly documents that the working class
has been the central actor in democratization throughout the
world (as opposed to earlier studies who credited the
bourgeoisie for democracy by considering "democratic" those
republics that left the bulk of the population
disenfranchised). We would not want to reduce revolutionary
movements and democratization to these two trends, but they
are key causes and the central global ones.
Decolonization is also a process with numerous
antecedents, but where global processes play central roles.
Colonial conquest by expanding core states served to
force commodification onto peoples that were previously
external to the system. As such, colonization was hastened
during K-wave downturns, when states use coercive means to
replace failing markets, and receded during expansions
(Boswell 1989). However, coercion adds less value as
markets spread and industrialization makes traditional
[Page 34]
colonial production an increasingly small part of the world
total. Colonization eventually became irrelevant for the
purposes of labor extraction, and the vast unused labor
reserves it forced into existence instead became a drag
on the world economy. Most of that "drag" was due to the
revolutionary resistance of colonial populations to their
subordination. Once the great source of "primitive
accumulation," after WWII colonialism probably cost
industrial core powers more in administrative and military
spending than they received in coerced unequal exchange.
Dependency would produce high profits in the "free" market,
making coerced exchange increasingly irrational.
As the most productive producers, hegemons have
historically supported decolonization (other than their own
colonies) because they profit most from trade unhindered by
imperial regulation. The cyclic combination of US hegemony
and a massive K-wave economic expansion during in the post-
WWII period raised resources to liberation movements and
made colonial wars increasingly costly, to the extent that
decolonization became irreversible. While nationalism has
its own sources that predate the post-war expansion, the
explosion of national states after the war is unprecedented.
The break-up of empires has continued with the dissolution
of multinational states, such as the USSR and Yugoslavia.
[Page 35]
How different this was from the pre-war period. The
greatest number of colonies ever were held in 1939 and
expansion by the core powers became a zero-sum war.
With decolonization has come a marked upturn in the
pace and degree of world integration. This is usually
explained by reference to technological changes in
transportation and communication. The contribution of
decolonization has also been important in replacing
administrative relations with market ones, and in dissolving
imperial market barriers to the world market. Capital
mobility to the low-wage periphery, always a feature of
capitalism, has tremendously accelerated as political
impediments have been removed and technology has become more
portable. Growing integration of the world economy has, in
turn, a contradictory effect on states, encouraging them to
both shrink yet expand at the same time. States are
shrinking down to nations but multi-state governments are
expanding.
On the one hand, transnational capital shifts the
political focus to international relations, where only
sovereign states are recognized actors. This rule of the
world order was established most forcefully in the Thirty
Years War. But it had only applied to a handful of core
[Page 36]
states, which outside the core were, ironically, colonial
empires. From about 1648 to 1948, the core and the
periphery had strikingly different politics, what we might
call nation-state politics versus class-nation politics.
In the core, states were identified with particular nations,
although each contained subordinate ethnic groups. Each
vied with competing nation-states for leadership and
hegemony over the system. Classes within those states
fought over political power and economic distribution. The
empires defined themselves as nation-states in their intra-
core relations and battles, and as empires in their rule over
almost all of the periphery.
In the periphery, nations would, at best, be represented as
provinces. As colonies of core imperialism, politics in the
periphery often fused class and national conflicts over economic
and political independence. While the class-nations of the
colonial periphery largely won the conflict for political
independence, thus becoming nation-states, they lost the war
for economic independence, having become thoroughly
monetized, specialized, dependent, and otherwise
incorporated into the world market.
World integration makes increasingly irrelevant any
authority that stands between the nation and the world
[Page 37]
market. This fuels national independence movements, as each
ethnic group finds their interests are increasingly
difficult to represent domestically. Every nationality needs
a state to operate at the global level. Military dominance
of national minorities or neo-colonies by dominant states or
ethnic groups now pays fewer benefits as well. As a result,
the geographic size of states is shrinking down to the size
of nations. States ruling over multiple nations will
continue to break-up for the foreseeable future. New
peripheral states now mimic the rules of what was the core
world order of nation states. This order is now world wide
in the geographic as well as the multicultural sense of the
term "world."
On the other hand, and at the same time, world
integration also fuels multi-state government. Most
prominent are the European Union (EU), and its North
American offspring (NAFTA). However this is also true of a
geometric rise in the number of international organizations,
both governmental (IGOs) and nongovernmental (INGOs) (Boli
1994). The rise of international organization follows a
basic principle of contracts in markets. Any voluntary
contract requires pre-contractual agreements on definitions
and standards, and post-contractual third party negotiation,
[Page 38]
adjudication and enforcement. This has been the function of
the world order, to which core states have only acceded
peacefully for long periods when the world order was infused
by a hegemon.
American hegemony is breaking down, and is being
replaced by a world polity of international organizations
and shared norms of liberal individualism. The phenomenal
growth in INGOs largely serves the "pre-contractual"
function, while the IGOs are haltingly being driven to become
the "post" third party enforcers. The greater the number of
states and decline of multi-national states (empires), the
greater the need for multi-state authorities to adjudicate
conflicts, guarantee standards and otherwise regulate
exchanges.
Multi-state organization benefits transnational capital
in particular, by reducing trading costs and setting
standards across borders. The EU is bringing lower costs and
increased consumption throughout Europe, and NAFTA appears
to be headed in the same direction. It also eases the shift
of capital to lower cost suppliers and lower wage labor.
What of labor?
There are benefits, eventually, from lower consumer prices
and from jobs increases in the resulting economic expansion.
[Page 39]
However, the shifts and losses of jobs often outweigh benefits,
at least for existing generations. Most importantly, without a
voice in the world polity, labor is unable to guarantee that the
benefits of economic expansion will not be hoarded by capital.
Resolving the environmental and social detriments of economic
development will also increasingly be a global question. Labor,
environmentalists, women and other progressive groups find
themselves in an almost 19th century situation of needing
enfranchisement. The movement for a voice in international
governmental institutions will be for the 21st century what
the democratization and decolonization movements were for the
19th and 20th centuries.
From Multi-State to World State
Three multi-state governmental organizations are emerging
to dominate the world economy -- the European Union (EU), the
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), and the
Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). As just these three polities
will regulate the vast bulk of the world-economy, a common
standard among them essentially sets a global standard. Yet
none of the three is hegemonic over other two. This creates
an unprecedented opportunity for international social
[Page 40]
movements, and for transnational capital, to have worldwide
political effects.
The multiplicity of competing imperial states has always been
a savior of capitalism. Competition among states prevented
consolidation into a world empire in the struggle of capital
against the nobility and against labor. It also disintegrated
attempts at building a socialist world-system or even maintaining
an international socialist movement.
If multi-state governments become the central political
actors in the core of the world-system, then the problem of
coordination will be at its lowest ebb in world history.
The multi-state organizations exist and a steady increase in
their importance seems likely, although not inevitable. A
multi-state world government follows from the same trend of
world economic integration but political fracturing into
nations. No one doubts a continuation of world market
integration and increasing power of IGOs such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO). What of states? There are as
many as 3000 ethnic nations with geographic identities,
which if only 20% achieve statehood, it would triple the
number of states. The smaller and more specialized each
nation state, the greater the benefits of multi-state
government.
[Page 41]
Continuation of this trend relies on at least the three
following assumptions:
1. democratization restrains the militarism and
imperialism of states, preventing global war;
2. state formation continues to produce sovereign
nations rather than imperial colonies or large
assimilated cultures;
3. uneven development without the inertia of
colonialism shifts leading sectors between states before
any can establish a long-term hegemony.
Of the three assumptions, democratization is the most
important. The latter two depend on it, as does world peace
versus wartime devastation. Historically, core democracies
have not fought one another (Russett 1993). Electoral
democracy restrains the autonomy and risk-taking of state
leaders, makes leaders justify wars (especially long ones),
creates an incentive to expand social spending (thus
restraining military spending), and reduces the ability of
capitalists to translate their particular interests into
imperial state interests. Democratic opponents are more
difficult to demonize and will change governments within a
[Page 42]
short time. Of course, democracies may deteriorate into
dictatorships (i.e., Germany in the 1930's) or may suffer a
majority tyranny (i.e., the former Yugoslavian states). The
constraints are not deterministic, but they have proven
powerful in the past.
Note however, that while the core states are now all
essentially democratic, the multi-state polities are only
indirectly representative (the largely powerless European
Parliament notwithstanding). International governmental
organizations now serve as boards of directors for ruling
states. While war between states has declined with
democratization, the probability of war between multi-state
governments increases as the latter grow stronger, yet
remain undemocratic (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995). For
democratization to continue to restrain states, social
movements must push for the consent of the governed to the
global level.
Finally, the move toward world government (whether
democratic or not) will probably require the initiative of a
world leader. Other sources of support -- social movements or
revolutions -- are important and even critical, but they need to
become transnational actors to be efficacious globally (i.e., a
world party, rather than a collection of national parties). If
[Page 43]
uneven development concentrates the leading economic sectors in a
multi-state world leader, the leader would benefit most from a
world government that is designed to enforce its version of "free"
trade. The leader could then become hegemonic by
institutionalizing its advantages in the world government, thus
creating the possibility of hegemony without a global war. This
would be a major change in the form of hegemony, but not
necessarily a change in the cycle and would surely not, by itself,
transform the system. For that to happen, the world government
would need to become a democratic institution rather than a
hegemonic instrument.
Whether a world government becomes an instrument for
hegemony, or becomes an institution for transforming the
capitalist world-system, depends on whether the world
government can be democratized. Here we have a chain of
possible events, from democratization of states, to
democratization of multi-state governments, to global
democracy.
Of the existing and potential multi-state coalitions,
one has a greater propensity to support democratization than
the other two. This one is Europe. The European Union has
the only institutional framework for multi-state democracy,
and has the strongest and most organized working class to
[Page 44]
fight for it -- the two ingredients key to democratization
in the past. Europe also has the most extensive social
welfare system, and thus the most to lose from competition by
low-wage workers in authoritarian states. European workers,
and their capitalists, would gain from the rise in wages and
welfare elsewhere brought by global democracy. Even if led
by Europe, any movement for a democratic world government
would need to be coordinated transnationally by global
social movements, and possibly a world party.
Is the European Union the most likely next world
leader? It has several advantages and innovations. Many
systemic theorists point to Japan's concentration of leading
economic sectors as making it best poised to contend for
world leadership during the second wave. If global war
returns, as a homogeneous island country, Japan is also
relatively insulated from at least conventional land war.
Without a global war to decimate competitors, however, Japan
would need to develop a multi-state framework in order to
compete (it may need such a framework even with a war,
including to fight it).
The EU's most important innovation is its multi-state
framework, which places it in the best position to develop
common world standards and expand interstate regulations
[Page 45]
(Bornschier 1994). NAFTA is a poor copy, unable to include
the multi-state governance structure due to the previous sunk
investment in US hegemony. Although trade pacts exist in Asia,
none compare to the EU or even NAFTA in regulating contracts.
This may prove an advantage of "backwardness" in the long run,
but that is not clear now. "Greater China," made up of China,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas Chinese, is perhaps an alternative
multi-state form (Weede 1995). But China also houses a huge
impoverished peasantry that will consume the benefits of its
high growth for decades before reaching European standards
of living. Without Japan, China is not a contender, and
vice versa, but Japan is not part of "Greater China."
Europe also has its own advantage of backwardness, in
that assembly line production was less developed than in the
US, thus aiding transition to flexible production in some
cases. It also has a cultural advantage in that past
European imperialism has produced shared languages and
cultural institutions throughout the world. While American
hegemony has long passed Europe in cultural popularity, past
imperialism over the Americas means that there is a
relatively strong affinity between cultures. Ironically,
the lack of imperialism beyond the region, along with a
distinct alphabet, hurts Japan and China in this regard
[Page 46]
(Bornschier 1995). On the other hand, European companies
have fared poorly in marketing technical innovations, where
Japan has the lead. Nor has Europe been able to project its
military power to enforce a world polity, a role held nearly
exclusively by the US. By most counts, the US is also still
far ahead on most economic indicators and a relative
equalization is still far off. A new hegemon or a world
government, if either one occurs, is perhaps 50 years away.
Conclusion: The World Polity Revisited?
Compared to past phases, the world-system now most resembles
the early 1500s, when a previous world polity reigned over
Europe. Enforcement of the then-Catholic polity was taken
up by the largest economic and military actor, then the
Hapsburgs/Spain and now the US. But the world leader in terms
of innovation was Portugal, which was too small and tied to
the old Catholic polity to become hegemonic -- a fate now
held by Japan. Leadership shifted to the Netherlands, whose
organizational and technical innovations led the way to
world hegemony when Spain was finally defeated.
Dutch hegemony required a major revolution and two
global wars, but it was the key turning point in securing
[Page 47]
the transition to a capitalist world-system. I have cast
the EU in the role of the United Netherlands. Of all the
current contenders, it has the greatest possibility of
leading the world to another transition, this time to global
democracy. I would not guess that the probability of such
an event in the next 50 years is high. It is less likely in
the next 50 years, I would guess, than a global war. The
point is, more than at any time in the past, the
possibility exists.
APPENDIX
Time-Series Regression of Hegemony Model
We can analyze a portion of the analytical model through
a time-series regression, presented in Table 3. Not
surprisingly, data are lacking for much of the model, but we
can analyze several key relations. This type of analysis
cannot fully test the theory, not only because of limited
data, but also because not all the causal relations are
directly amenable to a regression analysis (i.e., some
relations are not explicitly linear or quantitative, thus
requiring that we use dummy codes or other substitutes that
[Page 48]
add error to the estimates). Nor is all the variation due to
general causal processes. Amid that mass of particulars, the
elemental forces of common causal process, while critical
for the dynamics of history, may explain little of the
detail. Nevertheless, statistical analysis is appropriate
for examining our claims that a systemic process of hegemony
exists along with the historical particularities of each
case. While evidence is provided in the historical tables,
the claim benefits from confirmation by evidence of
extensive cross-case comparison. If no support is found,
the model should be seriously questioned.
The dependent variable (SEAHEG) is designed to measure
when world leaders can translate their power into economic
hegemony. I constructed it by taking the interaction of
Modelski and Thompson's (1988) naval measure of world
leadership with data on the cycle of hegemony. This and all
other measures are defined in the tabular notes. They
utilize the best long term data available at this time for
world-systemic research (see the referenced sources for
further discussion of the data or methods). Based on the
model displayed in Figure 1, the regression equation
includes the following expected determinants of hegemony
(all lagged 5 years):
[Page 49]
1. Past levels of world leadership in terms of sea
power concentration (L5SEA);
2. Major war intensity (L5INT), to measure the effects
of wars at all times;
3. The interaction of war and sea power concentration
(L5SEAWAR), which measures the effects of war when sea
power is concentrated;
4. Long economic waves (L5WAVEG), to indicate shifts
in the concentration of leading economic sectors;
5. The extent of decolonization (L5CTERM), which
indicates a decline in imperial regulation of
international relations, allowing for an increase in
hegemonic regulation;
6. Year as a control for linear trending, which
controls for the extraordinarily high sea power of the US.
The combination of the first three variables attempts
to measure the process of war and leadership. If a rising
leader goes into a war, hegemony is more likely, but war
undermines a hegemon in decline. Thus the interaction
(L5SEAWAR) is expected to have a positive effect, while wars
at other times (L5GINT) will be negative (one net of the
other). The other three determinants are expected to have
positive effects.
[Page 50]
===========================================================
Table 3: Time Series Regression of Sea Power Concentration
modified by Hegemonic Level (SEAHEG), 1500-1975
-------------------------------------------------------------
Estimate of Autocorrelation Coefficient:
Rho .96
Standard Error of Rho .01
Prais-Winsten Estimates:
Multiple R .21 R-Squared .05
AR1 Adj. R-Squared .03 Standard Error .05
[OLS Adj. R-Squared .58 (not corrected for AR1)]
Durbin-Watson 2.00
Analysis of Variance: DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 6 .05 .01
Residuals 467 1.12 .002
Variables in the Equation:
B SEB BETA T SIG T
L5SEA .12 .051 .11 2.32 .02
L5GINT -.00001 .000005 -.22 -1.87 .06
L5SEAWAR .00004 .000013 .33 2.82 .01
L5WAVEG .48 .337 .06 1.42 .16
YEAR .0002 .00036 .03 .62 .53
L5CTERM .002 .0009 .12 2.64 .01
CONSTANT -.24 .622 . -.38 .70
------------------------------------------------------------
[Page 51]
Variable Definitions and Sources:
SEAHEG = SEACON * HEGEMON Interaction variable designed to
measure when world leaders with a high
concentration of sea power can translate that
power into economic hegemony.
SEACON = Sea Power Concentration Index (Modelski and
Thompson 1988). This is a annual measure of
"world leaders" based on the concentration of
naval strength for the great powers, producing 5
peak concentrations that correspond to periods of
world leadership (Portugal, United Netherlands,
United Kingdom 1, United Kingdom 2, United
States), four of which reach hegemony over the
system (Hapsburgs; U.N.; U.K.2; U.S.).
HEGEMON = Coding of the hegemonic cycle wherein hegemonic
maturity =1.0; victory =.75; decline =.50; ascent
=.25; and competitive = .10 (see Table 2 for cycle
dates).
L5SEA = SEACON, 5 year lag.
YEAR = Years, which controls for any strictly linear
trending.
L5GINT = Intensity of major wars (intensity is battle
deaths divided by population; major wars are those
with a great power on each side) (Levy 1983); 5
year lag.
L5SEAWAR= L5SEA * L5GINT Interaction term measures effect of
war when sea power is high and vice versa.
L5CTERM = Annual number of overseas colonies liberated or
otherwise terminated as a separate colonial polity
(some were incorporated into other colonies,
dissolved, or otherwise lost, but after 1776,
almost all terminated colonies become independent
states). (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980; Boswell
1989), 5 year lag.
L5WAVEG = Long Waves of economic expansion and contraction,
weighted by the average change in available price
series, data found on table 2 (price series and
dates from Goldstein, 1988), 5 year lag.
===============================================================
[Page 52]
Discussion
As the theoretical model expects, the results show
significant effects in the expected direction for each of
the determinants. Included on the table are two different
adjusted R-squares, one of .58 from an OLS regression, and a
.03 when the regression is corrected for autocorrelated errors
(the coefficients are from the corrected equation).
Correcting for autocorrelated errors in time-series
regression mainly involves a partial differencing from past
values of the dependent variable (rho = .96). Most of the
variation in sea power is due to trending, so what is left
to explain is annual variation, which is the part most
influenced by particular, contingent or random processes
and least by systemic processes, as is reflected in the drop
in the R-square. However, as the systemic variables are
lagged 5 years, they are also determinants of up to 5 years
of lagged versions of the dependent variable. Thus the
actual variation explained probably falls somewhere between
the two estimates listed. As such, this is a quite
conservative test of the model and what is most important is
whether the relationships are still significant under these
conditions.
[Page 53]
More troublesome is the measure of hegemony. The novel
variable construction has the advantage of allowing us to
use a linear model to explain a cyclic process. The
disadvantage is that while sea power concentration is an
excellent measure of world leadership, we have only "dummy
codes" for the hegemonic cycle, so this is a less than ideal
dependent variable.
What if we just look at unmodified SEACON and HEGEMON
variables in otherwise identical equations? For SEACON, the
regression shows similar results except that long waves are
no longer significant; for HEGEMON, it only shows long waves
and decolonization as significant (results available from
the author on request). These two results seem to indicate
the military focus of leadership and economic import for
hegemony.
Finally, I also examined an alternative model that
included an independent variable designed to measure inertia
in the system. The variable was created by generating a
random number for each year, then turning it into a 20 year
moving average. The inertia variable was significant, but
had no substantive effect on the other equations. As a
random variable alone is unrelated to the dependent
variable, the significance of the inertia variable is simply
reflecting the slow trending in the system.
[Page 54]
ENDNOTES
1. The particular inventions may have occurred earlier, however.
Space does not permit details on the theory of k-waves, also called
Kondratieffs and long waves, which is well known to most readers
in any case. See Boswell (1987) for my interpretation.
2. Alternatively, the combination of two contradictory tendencies
could be seen as one dialectical principle.
3. For instance, Modelski emphatically denies that he ever
intended for Portugal to be considered a hegemon (public comments
at the International Studies Assoc. Convention, Washington DC,
1994, in the session, "On Growth, Innovation, and War").
4. While Portugal was the lead innovator in the early 1500s, the
Hapsburg dynasty ruled over so much of the Euro-American territory
and economy that Portuguese expansion was limited no matter how
much more productive it was. With the ascension of Charles V to
emperor in 1519, the Hapsburg empire included Spain (and Spanish
America) in the west, the Netherlands in the north, and the Holy
Roman Empire in central Europe. Imperial integration was built
around the common interest of subduing the Turks in the east and
the French (and later the Dutch and English) in the west, and
[Page 55]
through the Counter Reformation, in (re-)establishing the Catholic
world polity. After division in 1556, both dynastic and polity
enforcement in the west fell to Spain, which waged near continual
war for the next 100 years. While Spanish economic power peaked in
the 1550s, its relative naval power peaked in 1594-7 in a classic
example of military over-extension (Modelski and Thompson 1988;
Kennedy 1989).
In Britain's 18th century case, the world order of 1714
followed an inconclusive global war, the purpose of which was to
prevent French hegemony -- the French were attempting to forge a
dynastic union with Spain. The peace was designed to restore the
Westphalian dynastic balance of power of 1648. As such, post-war
British expansion challenged rather than reinforeced the
international structure of power. Peace was therefore short lived.
Britain had sea power superiority, but its competitors had not been
devastated during the war. Economically, the leading sectors were
primarily in colonial goods, and thus British leadership was due
more to its colonial empire than to the superior efficiency of its
industry or trade.
[Page 56]
5. The term, "bifurcation points," comes from chaos theory, a now-
popular theory of dynamic systems. I claim no specialty in the
field, but it provide stimulating new analogies to world-systemic
dynamics. According to Stinchcombe, analogies across disciplines
are the principle source of theoretical innovations and insights in
scientific fields. I find that making analogies from the
chaos theory to dialectical theories of economic development
provides new insights on the workings of the world-system. In
particular, we had not explained bifurcation points or
the source of what seemed to be inertia-laden systems. Bifurcation
has been used to describe several different types of divisions.
Here it is used to describe the point at which a system in
equilibrium begins to oscillate. The analogy is that the rise and
fall of hegemonies is an oscillation in the system.
6. The Dutch and American cases have global wars at the end of
their first wave expansion and at the beginning of their second,
and both become hegemonic during the second expansion. They differ
in that the Dutch emerged as a world leader with a lasting naval
superiority after its first global war, while the US did not become
an unmatched military leader until its second global war (despite
its brief post-WWI military superiority). The UK does not have a
second global war that divides leadership from hegemony, perhaps
because it had a prior leadership.
[Page 57]
7. Three predictions perhaps deserve the name. In 1982, Chase-
Dunn (1982) explained that the socialist states had not left the
capitalist world-system, nor had they constructed a self-
reproducing alternative system. Instead, state socialism was
better understood as a political program to improve
a country's standing within the system. He suggested that they
would become more like other capitalist countries over time, but he
did not offer a time frame or predict the revolutions of 1989.
Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1990), in a collection of papers
written during the 1980s, explicitly predicted that the decline of
US hegemony would have a mirror effect on the East, with the
implications of a break-up of the Soviet bloc. However, they too
failed to offer a timeframe or to predict revolutions. Boswell
and Peters (1990), writing in the summer of 1989 about the revolts
in Poland and China, predicted that they would spread to other
state socialist countries (a prediction that became an outcome by
the time of publication, see their footnote #1). They also hinted
that ethnic nationalism would break-up Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union. While they predicted revolts, their proximity to the events
makes it less surprising and even then, they did not predict that
the other states would fall so quickly.
[Page 58]
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