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Vol. 2, No. 2 TOWARD A PRAXIS OF WORLD INTEGRATION
W. Warren Wagar
History Department
Binghamton University
State University of New York
Binghamton, NY 13901 USA
wwagar@binghamton.edu
Prepared for presentation at the 90th Annual Meeting of
the American Sociological Association, Washington,
D.C., August 19-23, 1995. Copyright 1995 by W. Warren
Wagar.
The theme of the 90th annual meeting of the
American Sociological Association is "Community of
Communities: Shaping Our Future." The program asks
three leading questions: must the plurality of
communities now identifying themselves throughout the
world "along ethnic, racial, gender, religious, and
other lines...be blended away to ensure civility? Or,
can we have a society of vying tribes without shared
bonds and values? Or can there be a shared framework
in which many colorful elements find a new place...[in]
a community of communities?"
The authors of the program might just as well have
asked--transferring these questions to the realm of
[Page 1]
domestic relations--whether husband and wife should
fuse into some kind of fabulous androgynous quadruped,
go their separate ways, or form an interdependent
partnership respecting the rights and values of each.
Obviously these are not serious questions. No attempt
is made to problematize the issues at stake. The
authors offer only one "right" answer, the third path
of partnership, of mutualist multiculturalism, a future
in which radical feminism, fundamentalist Islam,
populist libertarianism, militant Hinduism, Marxian
socialism, born-again Christianity, megacorporate
capitalism, Bosnian nationalism, Serbian nationalism,
and all the other colliding forces at work in our
whirling world somehow lie down together like lions and
lambs in the New Jerusalem and agree to eat grass, or
better yet, develop the capacity to feed themselves by
photosynthesis. It is a profoundly "nice" answer. It
is also profoundly wrong, at least for the 1990s.
My own answer is to ask a fourth (and also
leading) question. "Should our society of vying tribes
be transformed into a single planetary civilization
that strives to make all people equal and free?" In
other words, should our system of predatory global
capitalism flourishing in a political environment of
competing sovereign states be replaced by a democratic,
liberal, and socialist world commonwealth?
If you say yes, please note that you are not
giving a multiculturalist response. Your response
implies, and indeed requires, the acceptance by the
great mass of humankind of a common secular culture
derived from the intellectual revolution of the late
17th and 18th centuries in Western Europe--from the
Enlightenment and its sequels in the 19th century.
That common secular culture obviously has roots deep in
human history, but it happened to flower first in one
[Page 2]
place and at one time. For many of the same reasons,
having nothing to do with race or gender, Western
Europe was also the cradle of the capitalist world-
economy. Because of the place and the time, those who
articulated the culture of the Enlightenment and its
sequels, from John Locke to Karl Marx, were almost
entirely Caucasian males. Is this a problem? No
doubt. But it is not a problem that will go away by
chanting multiculturalist mantras.
As I understand world-system theory, its adherents
believe that the moral destiny of the modern world-
system is to be transformed into a new kind of world-
system altogether: in Immanuel Wallerstein's phrase,
"neither a redistributive world-empire nor a capitalist
world-economy but a socialist world-government."
(Wallerstein, 1979: 35; cf. Wallerstein, 1984: 156-158
and 172) Christopher Chase-Dunn favors a socialist
world-system with a "democratically controlled world
federation," a federation that may come into existence
even before the arrival of socialism (Chase-Dunn, 1989:
343-345). Samir Amin speaks of supplanting the
reactionary utopia of "globalization via the market"
with "an alternative humanistic project of
globalization consistent with a socialist perspective."
One necessary ingredient in this project is an embry-
onic "world parliament" representing social interests
on a global scale. (Amin, 1994a: 341-342)
Such a world-system should arise, according to
world-system theory, but it is not what must arise.
There is no inevitability about it, no iron law of
socialist succession inscribed in the book of world
history. "It is more than evident," writes Amin, "that
current trends are not going in the direction described
above." Dominant forces are maneuvering for short-term
gain while the leaders of popular resistance opt for
[Page 3]
"illusory solutions, such as fundamentalism or
chauvinism." In the absence of a responsible socialist
response to the present-day crisis of the capitalist
world-system, "regressive and criminal scenarios will
be the most likely order of the day." (Amin, 1994a:
342-343)
I find myself in complete agreement. The next
fifty years --and more--are likely to produce a
reasonable facsimile of hell on earth, a time compared
to which the last fifty years may survive in memory as
a veritable golden age. Nevertheless, the goal of
world-system theorists, and certainly my goal, is a
socialist world-system, a system that is both
democratic and egalitarian, that provides both freedom
and equality, which, as Wallerstein cogently argues,
are each inconceivable without the other (Wallerstein,
1991: 81-82).
Where did these values come from? Does a
Christian pope or a Muslim mullah or an Indian
nationalist or an African chieftain have to embrace
them, to remain true to his or her heritage? Clearly
not. Do they form the moral and philosophical
underpinnings of an emergent secular planetary culture
grounded in certain specific traditions in modern
Western European thought? Clearly they do.
Wallerstein warns us to avoid "the Charybdis of neo-
Enlightenment universalism," just as we must steer
clear of "the Scylla of self-defeating particularisms."
(Wallerstein, 1984: 172). He is right, if by neo-
Enlightenment universalism he means a technocratic
trampling of local cultures by self-appointed Fabian-
style "experts," as in the utopias of H.G. Wells.
But facts must be faced, choices must be made, and
things must be called by their proper names. The
doctrine of democratic socialism is a product of the
[Page 4]
Enlightenment with claims to universal moral authority,
which world-system theorists accept. Whenever local
cultures diverge from its values, as they often do and
often will, we must assert, and persuade others to
assert, the priority of democratic socialism. Not that
our values are unchallengeable or destined to prevail
forever--of course not. But either they are our values
today or they are not. Either they form the rational
basis for a consensual world civilization and culture
or they do not. A purely relativistic
multiculturalism, the toleration of all values and all
cultures, no matter how intolerant or predatory they
themselves may be, is incompatible with the goals of
world-system theory, and has no legitimate place in
world-system praxis. Wallerstein concedes this point,
in effect, when he notes that all antisystemic
movements contain "important elements that are no
longer antisystemic in spirit. ... These elements have
to go." They cannot be purged by party-line
dogmatists, he adds, but he foresees their voluntary
departure if and when the antisystemic movements
"reaffirm in concrete operational ways their commitment
to transforming the capitalist world-economy into a
world order that will be libertarian, egalitarian,
fraternal." (Wallerstein in Amin et al., 1990: 46) In
other words, if and when the antisystemic movements
adopt the cardinal values of the Left Enlightenment and
adopt them as paramount.
Well and good, but why should they do this? The
heart of the problem, and the stumbling block in the
way of a praxis of socialist world integration, I
suggest, is the whole concept of "antisystemic
movements." Jesus of Nazareth is reported to have said
"He that is not with me is against me; and he that
gathereth not with me scattereth abroad." (Matthew
[Page 5]
12:30) World-system theory tends to assume a variant
of this: "Those who are against the system are with
us." There is, says Wallerstein, a whole "family" of
such movements. Some members of the family waver, and
may even fall by the wayside when their immediate goals
are achieved, such as seizure of state power, but
nonetheless any movement in any degree of opposition to
the capitalist world-system and/or its colluding
dominant national states is somehow, almost mystically,
a comrade-movement of all the others.
In their book Transforming the Revolution, five
world-system theorists--Wallerstein, Amin, Giovanni
Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Marta Fuentes--debate
the relative merits of the various kinds of
antisystemic movements at work in the world of the late
20th century. Arrighi pins most of his hopes on
workers' movements, Amin on national movements in the
Third World, Frank and Fuentes on social movements such
as organizations engaged in struggles for women's
rights, world peace, and the environment. Wallerstein
looks forward to "a self-conscious federation of all
three kinds of movements." (Amin et al., 1990: 185)
The great question, however, is whether
antisystemic movements are really antisystemic. Are
women's movements intrinsically opposed to the
capitalist world-system and its sovereign polities?
No. Women's movements are intrinsically opposed to the
denial of an equal place for women in a world hitherto
largely dominated by men. Are movements aimed at
national liberation--for example, the movement for an
independent and unified Kurdistan--intrinsically
opposed to the capitalist world-system and its
sovereign polities? No. Such national movements are
intrinsically opposed to the exclusion of their peoples
from the ranks of the sovereign polities. Is Islamic
[Page 6]
evangelism intrinsically antisystemic? No. It wants
to convert the world to faith in Islam, which might or
might not (and more likely would not) involve the
dismantling of the modern world-economy and its network
of sovereign national states. Even workers' movements
are not necessarily antisystemic. They exist to fight
for the interests and rights of workers, which might or
might not involve collaboration with capitalism and the
state system.
In _Building the City of Man_, some 25 years ago,
I devoted a chapter to what I called "half measures and
red herrings" (Wagar, 1971: 27-47), an unsparing
assessment of the "antisystemic" movements abroad in
the world of the 1960s. I fired volley after volley
against the peace movement, the world federalist
movement, scientism and technocracy, neo-nationalism,
and the digressive romanticism and anarchism of the New
Left. I spoke perhaps too harshly, but most of my
strictures still make sense. Those who are against
some facet or two of the modern world-system are not
necessarily, intrinsically, or fundamentally against
the world-system itself. For the most part they simply
want their share of the spoils, their piece of the
action.
World-system theorists are not, of course, naively
unaware of the grave shortcomings of most allegedly
antisystemic movements and ideologies. Andre Gunder
Frank, for example, shows little or no patience with
nationalism, no matter where it flourishes and no
matter how radical its rhetoric. Under late 20th-
century conditions, he contends, nationalism is
ultimately a bourgeois ideology, prosystemic and
hostile to socialism, which it always beats out
whenever the two compete for support, "like iron
against wood." (Frank in Amin et al., 1982: 153) Much
[Page 7]
the same criticism can be made of sectarian religious
movements. Both were prime vectors of capitalism in
the past, and may well assist its spread in the future,
or at the very least neutralize the efforts of class-
based movements to oppose capitalist oppression.
(Frank in Amin et al., 1982: 113) Wallerstein concedes
that nationalism is more often not antisystemic, and
even when antisystemic tends to decay into a
prosystemic force over time. In fact, as Michels long
ago observed, and Wallerstein agrees, all antisystemic
movements, to the extent that they are forced by the
exigencies of power-seeking to organize, become the
prisoners of their own bureaucracies and lose their
revolutionary momentum (Wallerstein, 1984: 130).
Nevertheless, most world-system theorists insist
that a wide variety of antisystemic movements abound in
the contemporary world whose thrust, at least
initially, is genuinely and deeply antisystemic. They
reject the simon-purity of co-optation theory, which
denounces the empowerment of nominally antisystemic
forces as a trick by global capitalism to buy them off.
Such a theory, writes Wallerstein, would be "disas-
trous" as a prescription for policy. (Wallerstein,
1984: 138) Antisystemic movements must work together,
forging alliances and resisting processes that lead to
their ghettoization. (Wallerstein in Amin et al.,
1990: 46 and 52)
Perhaps. Yet is there really any hope that this
can happen? What Wallerstein or I may call
"ghettoization" is probably not ghettoization from the
sectarian point of view of the leaders of the various
so-called antisystemic movements, for the simple reason
that few of them are antisystemic by their own lights.
They may rail against this or that aspect of the modern
world-system, as indeed do many of its own appointed
[Page 8]
spokespersons, but their agendas are very different
from ours. Few are committed to the building of a
socialist world-government. Most do not oppose the
sovereignty of armed national states. Many participate
wholeheartedly in the games of the global market. So
why speak of antisystemic movements at all? What is
the usefulness of the concept? Does it conform to
ideological and political reality or is it just a way
of making us feel less lonely and less isolated in a
deeply hostile world? Is it the cornerstone of an
authentic praxis of world integration or a _fata
morgana_ that generates false hope?
The truth probably lies somewhere in between these
two extremes. It is certainly not the case that only
world-system theorists offer concerted opposition to
the modern world-system. There are surely many
thousands of people, even many hundreds of thousands of
people, around the world who are fundamentally opposed
to it, even if the movements in which they work are
not. And if world-system theorists are right about the
likely eventual demise of the capitalist world-system
through the joint operation of antisystemic movements
and its own internal contradictions, including the
fulfillment of Marx's forecast of the immiserization of
the working class worldwide (upheld by recent trends in
the core countries as well as by long-run trends in the
periphery), there will surely be many millions of such
opponents massing in years to come.
But I would caution world-system theorists against
investing too much hope in the nominally or apparently
antisystemic movements visible in today's world. They
are a slender and wobbly reed, and at all odds little
inclined to collaborate. As Wallerstein has often
said, what we need is a global strategy for pooling
such strength as we have, and pooling this strength
[Page 9]
interzonally, from periphery to core and back again. A
profound radicalization of objectives, he observes,
will be required to forge such a new interzonal
politics (see especially Wallerstein, 1991: 80-81).
How can we set about pooling our widely scattered
forces and (if possible) reconciling the members of our
squabbling so-called family of antisystemic movements?
To quote Wallerstein once again, individual insight may
be largely unavailing in this matter, since the
building of an egalitarian democratic world order
demands a "social praxis socially arrived at."
(Wallerstein, 1991: 229)
But perhaps we can take small fumbling steps
toward a praxis of world integration, and this I have
tried to do in my book A Short History of the Future
(Wagar, 1992), which revives the idea already broached
in Building the City of Man (Wagar, 1971: 57-67) of a
World Party. A Short History of the Future takes the
form of a narrative of the history of the next 200
years and imagines both the worst and the best that can
happen: a massive environmental crisis, the neo-neo-
imperialist division of the peripheral nations into
spheres of domination by the core, a terminal crisis of
capitalism after thirty-odd further years of inspired
self-preservation, and a North-South world war,
followed by the eventual triumph of worldwide socialism
among the survivors, the bureaucratic decay of
socialist world governance, and its replacement--but
not until the mid-22nd century--by the very "community
of communities" hailed in the program of the 90th
annual meeting of the ASA.
The leading role in this transformation is played
by the World Party, an international movement founded
in 2035 that takes as its principal goal the
integration of the human race under the banner of
[Page 10]
democratic socialism. By the spring of 2044, its
members have infiltrated scores of governments around
the world and the boards of all the megacorporations.
The obvious inability of the old order to save itself
wins the World Party many new and influential converts
during the critical months just before interzonal war
breaks out that summer.
Afterwards, no single movement has anything like
its moral authority or political momentum. Beginning
with its many adherents in the nations of the Southern
hemisphere, which survive the Catastrophe more or less
intact, the cadres of the World Party build, piece by
piece, a union of states pledged to form a world
polity, known simply as the Commonwealth. Chile and
Australia are the first to adhere, in 2050. They are
soon followed by several dozen others. On May Day,
2062, 40 states with World Party governments formally
proclaim the establishment of the Commonwealth and
merge their sovereignties.
This still leaves a good part of the world
unincorporated, including the ravaged lands of North
America, Japan, and Europe, which had been reduced to
something like anarchy in the aftermath of the war.
The World Party leadership splits on the issue of
whether they should be allowed to find their own way
into the Commonwealth or should be brought in by force.
The latter view prevails, and for the next six years
the World Militia of the Commonwealth wages armed
conflict with a variety of crudely improvised local
regimes and competing movements to secure the
allegiance of the survivors in these critical quarters
of the world. The last skirmishes end in 2068. Two
years later representatives of every country meet in
Melbourne to accept their incorporation into the now
universal Commonwealth.
[Page 11]
It was never my intention, in choosing this
particular scenario, to argue that only in the
aftermath of a ruinous world war that destroys the core
nations and drastically reduces the earth's population
can humankind find a way to build a democratic and
socialist world order. But a vast interzonal military
showdown in a time of multiplying misery is far from
inconceivable. In any event, the transforming agency
is not the war as such, but the World Party.
Why a party? And what kind of party?
Wallerstein, in another use of the Scylla and Charybdis
metaphor, warns against over-reliance on a single kind
of political instrumentality. "Scylla is to assume
that only one form, a party form, is legitimate.
Charybdis is that everything goes." (Wallerstein,
1984: 144) The World Party, to be sure, is a political
party, which founds the global Commonwealth, becomes
its governing party in the 2060s, and remains the
majority party in its People's Congress until 2121.
But in the years before the Catastrophe of 2044, it
plays little or no part in parliamentary politics. It
begins, modestly enough, as a study group of university
alumni (to be droll, I chose Binghamton University as
their alma mater). As it grows across North America
and into Latin America, Europe, and Russia, the members
of the World Party function simultaneously at two
levels--above ground, holding open meetings and
publishing provocative analyses of the world crisis of
the 21st century, but also below ground, smuggling its
agents (known familiarly as "viruses") into positions
of responsibility in governments and corporations,
which they make it their business to betray when the
time is ripe. The very radicalism of its program
ensures that the World Party is the only antisystemic
global political force to survive the third world war.
[Page 12]
An obvious shortcoming of this scenario is that I
say nothing about sister movements that might have
aided the work of the World Party, movements that the
World Party in its turn might have helped to
coordinate. In retrospect, I wish I had included such
movements, even if I had to construct them--like the
World Party itself--out of whole cloth.
But what I think makes the World Party an
attractive idea is that, as its name indicates, it is
both global (meaning multinational and interzonal) and
political (meaning an instrument for the acquisition of
public power). Although it is clear that movements to
conserve the environment, struggle for the civil rights
of all groups, improve the conditions of working
people, abolish judicial murder and laws abridging
reproductive choice, and work for social justice in all
its manifestations contribute to the building of world
socialism, what is lacking in today's global political
culture is an overarching mobilized consciousness of
the need to confront the capitalist world-system
collectively. As world-system theory demonstrates, the
sovereign state system that originated in Western
Europe during the Middle Ages is a tool of the world-
economy. From the late 15th century to the present it
has facilitated the global grasp of capitalist
enterprise. There could have been no capitalist world-
economy without it. Although it thrives on the claims
of each state to sovereign armed power throughout its
realm, it is nonetheless a global phenomenon,
displaying a high degree of isomorphism, as John W.
Meyer argues (Meyer, 1987; cf. Chase-Dunn, 1989: 103-
105), and reasonably stable despite periodic
convulsions and vain quests for empire by Habsburgs,
Bourbons, and Hohenzollerns, together with their
pathological heir, Adolf Hitler. Given the intimate
[Page 13]
collaboration of the world-economy and its state
system, and the globalization achieved in all areas of
life by the machinations of capital, no effective and
durable alternative to the capitalist world-system is
imaginable except through a coordinated process of
world socialist revolution, which national movements
have proved historically incapable of mounting.
Thus I agree with Andre Gunder Frank and, for that
matter, with Eric Hobsbawm (see Hobsbawm, 1977: 9) that
socialism and nationalism (at least in our time) are
fundamentally antithetical. The chauvinism decried by
Amin is not a perversion of nationalism but a
ubiquitous characteristic of nationalism. In its bones
it is separatist, divisive, and prosystemic. For
socialism, it has been an unqualified disaster (see
Wagar, 1995). Stalin's proclamation of "socialism in
one country" was nearly the death-knell of socialism in
our century, the most lethal single error in its whole
history. Visions of "socialist" development such as
Stalin's turn out to be virtually indistinguishable,
writes Frank, "from orthodox everyday bourgeois
capitalist theory and praxis of 'national
development'." (Frank in Amin et al., 1982: 149)
The only way to prevent socialists from falling
into the spider web of nationalism and having the life
sucked out of them by the beast at its center is to
insist on a transnational and transzonal framework for
all political activity at the local or national level.
There may possibly be room for a Kurdish (or
Palestinian or Irish or Sikh) nationalism in the World
Party, but only if the national leaders concerned swear
a solemn oath to build a socialist world-government:
in short, the swiftest possible mundialization of their
liberated states. Their highest allegiance must always
be to the Civitas Humana, not to Athens or Jerusalem.
[Page 14]
If national leaders cannot make that commitment, they
are of no use to us, or, ultimately, to themselves.
What, in fact, will happen? In all candor I am
not wildly optimistic. The World Party does not yet
exist. I see no inkling of it on the political
horizon. On the contrary, the initial response of the
disempowered and the marginalized to our crisis
everywhere has been flight. In Benjamin R. Barber's
phrase, the alternative to "McWorld"--the integrative
forces at work in the capitalist global economy--has
been "Jihad," escape to projects of separation and
sectarian passion. McWorld and Jihad are opposites,
and yet much the same in the threat they pose to the
quest for liberty and justice. "If the global future
is to pit Jihad's centrifugal whirlwind against
McWorld's centripetal black hole, the outcome is
unlikely to be democratic." (Barber, 1992: 53)
What we may see is a kind of structured and surely
undemocratic chaos, in which some polities and some
segments of the capitalist world-system remain intact,
and even vigorous, while the rest fall apart. Amin and
Wallerstein, in their separate ways, look to the
prospects for chaos with a mixture of apprehension and
hope. Amin speculates that the gradual
industrialization of the peripheries will create not an
integrated world labor market but a polarized
proletariat, in the core countries pursuing a social-
democratic strategy and in the peripheries a Leninist-
Maoist revolutionary strategy, beyond the power of
capitalist regulatory mechanisms to control. No
regulatory mode, he writes, will be able to "match the
scale of problems that arise. Rather, I see the future
more as mounting chaos." (Amin, 1994b: 213) His hope
is that various regions in the peripheries will resist
collectively, challenging and perhaps in time over-
[Page 15]
whelming the prevailing world-system. The struggle
will most likely begin in Asia, but once under way,
"powerful social forces will rally to it from all
regions of the world." (Amin, 1994a: 347) The only
question is whether such resistance will be "humanis-
tic" and "universalist," or merely centrifugal.
Pondering the middle-run prospects of the
capitalist world-economy, Wallerstein for his part has
envisaged three principal scenarios: a struggle for
hegemony culminating in a new world war by 2050, the
elaboration of a new inegalitarian world order by the
current holders of privilege (somewhat like my vision
of "Earth, Inc." in A Short History of the Future), and
"a crumbling away of the world-system," leading to
massive political instability and social chaos. He
concludes: "It should be clear that my own bias, with
some trepidation, lies with this third scenario as the
one most likely to lead us to a relatively egalitarian,
relatively democratic world order." (Wallerstein,
1991: 135-136) Chaos will be messy and uncomfortable
for those stuck in the middle of it, but it may be the
least of three evils, and the progenitor, in the long
run, of the Civitas Humana.
Of course no one knows or can know. But I persist
in believing that with or without the aid of chaos in
the world-system, a transnational party firmly
committed to the democratic integration of all peoples
is essential to steer us through the storms of the next
century. Before such a party can germinate and take
root, a consensus must emerge among progressive forces
throughout the world that our destination as a species
is neither the global shopping center and sweatshop of
capitalism nor the war of all against all, but a new
planetary civilization in which every human being
everywhere has an equal voice. In time the citizens of
[Page 16]
such a world-city may find they no longer need its
common roof, and may peacefully scatter into many
disparate communities each under its own roof. But I
do not see "a community of communities" as a realistic
goal for the 21st century. The next step must be to
bring us all together, and to take that step we need
institutions opposed to the doomed and polarized world-
system of capitalism, institutions that are unambiguously
political, unambiguously global, and unambiguously devoted
to the ideology of the Left Enlightenment.
REFERENCES
Amin, Samir (1994a), tr. Beatrice Wallerstein. "The
Future of Global Polarization," Review, XVII, Summer,
337-347.
Amin, Samir (1994b), tr. Michael Wolfers. Re-Reading
the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary. New
York: Monthly Review Press.
Amin, Samir, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and
Immanuel Wallerstein (1982). Dynamics of Global
Crisis. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Amin, Samir, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank,
Marta Fuentes, and Immanuel Wallerstein (1990).
Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the
World-System. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Barber, Benjamin R. (1992). "Jihad Vs. McWorld," The
Atlantic Monthly, CCLXIX, March, 53-63.
[Page 17]
Chase-Dunn, Christopher (1989). Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy. Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hobsbawm, E. J. (1977). "Some Reflections on The Break-Up of Britain." New Left Review, CV (September- October). Meyer, John W. (1987). "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual: Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 41-70. Wagar, W. Warren (1971). Building the City of Man: Outlines of a World Civilization. New York: Grossman. Wagar, W. Warren (1992). A Short History of the Future, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wagar, W. Warren (1995). "The Disaster of Nationalism," CrossRoads, No. 51, May, 22-24. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979). The Capitalist World- Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1984). The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1991). Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Page 18] |
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