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Volume 3, Number 2 (Spring 1997)by Myron J. Frankman* Cite: Frankman, Myron J. (1997). "No Global War? A Role for Democratic Global Federalism." Journal of World-Systems Research 3: 321 - 338. © 1997 Myron J. Frankman * Revised version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the Society for Socialist Studies, Brock University, June 3, 1996. This paper was prepared during the author's stay as Visiting Academic in 1995-96 in the Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Universidad de Chile, Santiago. INTRODUCTION Between 1943 and 1946 E.B. White wrote a series of editorials in The New Yorker magazine supporting democratic federal world government. In his editorial of June 1, 1946, he wrote: World government is an appalling prospect. . . . Certainly the world is not ready for government on a planetary scale. In our opinion, it will never be ready. The test is whether the people will chance it anyway -- like children who hear the familiar cry, 'Coming whether ready or not!' At a Federalist convention the other day, Dean Katz of the University of Chicago said, 'Constitutions have never awaited the achievement of trust and a matured sense of community; they have been born of conflicts between groups which have found a basis for union in spite of deep suspicions and distrusts.' The only condition more appalling, less practical, than world government is the lack of it in this atomic age. (185-86) In fact, the issue is not whether we shall be governed globally, but rather by whom and on what basis. The international realm is not one of anarchy as the realists would have us believe, but rather one of order: of rules, procedures and accepted norms of behavior associated in part with what are termed "international regimes" (Krasner 1983), each dedicated in principle to a separate functional domain. Global governance is not something that is to be created, but rather something to be altered in the public interest. The governance of the globe is currently configured by a shifting set of ill-coordinated actors: among them the one remaining super-power and, to a lesser extent, other strong states, as well as powerful individuals and a number of large transnational corporations and financial institutions. Whereas Le Monde Diplomatique (1995) speaks of les nouveaux maîtres du monde, Robert Cox has summed up our current system of global governance with the phrase nébuleuse: "There is, in effect, no explicit political or authority structure for the global economy. There is, nevertheless, something there that remains to be deciphered, something that could be described by the French word nébuleuse or by the notion of 'governance without government.'" (1992/1996: 311) [1] [Page 321] Our current system of global governance is one of rule by the few. While an increasing number of the world's countries are procedural or even substantive democracies, global governance is far from democratic. Moreover, those international institutions where diverse voices are heard are precisely those with not only the least power to act on matters of substance, but with the most precarious financing. Imagine what the circumstances of national federal governments would be today if they had to rely for funds on a combination of voluntary assessments and proceeds from the sale of greeting cards. Without both cooperation and funding by the US, actions approved in the UN General Assembly are essentially dead letters. The mid-1970s General Assembly resolutions creating a New International Economic Order (Resolutions 3201 and 3202, 6th Special Session, May 1, 1974), and that proclaiming the Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281, 29th Session, December 12, 1974) were doomed by the de facto veto of the US before they were even approved. In the International Monetary Fund the US has had a de jure veto on matters requiring a special majority (of first 80% and later 85%) of the weighted votes since the Fund was created at Bretton Woods in 1944 based largely on the American drafted proposal. Delays by the US in approving subsequent increases in country quotas (the source of the Fund's own resources) have been a key element in the conversion over the years of the IMF from a credit union to a powerful global financial watchdog. (Kenen 1989) Like it or not, we have a global culture, one which the governing few have had a major hand in shaping. If we consider a culture to be characterized as a network of conversations, then it follows that cultures change with alterations in the content of the conversations. (Maturana 1995: 132) Conversations, and hence cultures, have changed throughout the world both by chance and by systematic orchestration by powerful private interests. (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Marchak 1991; Saul 1995) [Page 322] As the evolving global culture is one that presently celebrates individual rights without responsibilities, we have witnessed over the past two decades substantial increases in inequality of wealth and income. Comparative international data on income disparities are at best fragmentary and of recent vintage, but one estimate of the ratio of the income of the richest 20% to that of the poorest 20% of the world's population, based on a ranking by national average income, suggests a gap which widened from 30/1 in 1960 to 59/1 in 1989. (United Nations Development Programme 1992: 34-36 & 96-103) An account in a joint IMF-World Bank journal even counsels us to forget income convergence between countries and even regionally within developing countries, unless there are "serious changes in economic policies" in those countries. (Pritchett 1996: 43) The Human Development Report 1996 identifies a number of types of prominent growth patterns, among them jobless growth, voiceless growth, rootless growth, futureless growth and ruthless growth. Associated with "ruthless growth" was an absolute decline of the per capita income of one billion people over the period 1980-93 (UNDP 1996: 2) A recent evaluation for the United States showed that between 1976 and 1989 the share of the nation's net wealth held by the richest 1% of the country's households had increased from 21% to 36%, reversing a prior decade-long decline. (Wolff 1995: 67) Past gains in income, job security and access to social services, often achieved by way of concerted political action, have been weakened, if not actually swept aside. NATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO GLOBALISM Robert Gilpin has characterized our current predicament as being the dilemma of the limits of national welfare capitalism in a non-welfare international capitalist world.(1987: 60-64) We live in an integrated world economy with few effective control mechanisms to provide offsets to the varied national impacts of global economic activities. Indeed, governments, acting in response to external constraints, pursue strategies that reinforce some of the adverse national consequences. André Drainville has elaborated on this in his description of global accumulation being validated politically by state-bound democracies and on their ability to strike social compromises. Drawing on Desmond King, Drainville describes how citizens are called upon to embrace economic rationality and "lead the assault on . . . the social rights of citizenship". (1995: 60) [Page 323] People cannot be counted on, however, to faithfully function indefinitely in the interests of global accumulation. As the divergence-widening effects of the current scheme of global governance with its supporting national manifestations become more and more obvious, reactions begin to set in. One common reaction is to point to "others" as being the threat to one's job (Richmond 1994). But immigration controls are not a solution to the employment problem, which is but one of a range of human interactions which can only be dealt with successfully by collective action on a global scale. The insistence that national solutions be sought to problems generated by global accumulation is essentially a recipe to "divide and conquer." Combining a closing of borders to immigration with an insistence that poor countries resolve their own problems serves to exacerbate two of the elements (population pressure and inequality) which Christopher Chase-Dunn and Bruce Podobnik have identified as causal factors heightening the probability of future "core wars". (1995: 13) The Latin Americans have invented a word to describe a procedural democracy where participation is not merely limited, but actively suppressed: a democradura -- hard democracy. (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 41) In its original usage the phrase referred to a pact between civil authorities and the military to establish limited democracy. The term seems more broadly applicable: are we not already seeing the signs of an emerging democradura in a number of northern countries, including Canada, as the will to maintain social programs erodes? (Greider 1992; Saul 1995) The limits on state action arising from the (real or anticipated) hypersensitivity of financial markets has led to what Susan Strange has called the end of opposition from established parties: differences between policies of government and opposition parties disappear, as "society, economy and authority are no longer bound by the frontiers of the territorial state." (Strange 1995: 291,301) One hastens to add that where opposition does remain, it is treated as a fringe (either dangerous or irrelevant) that unrealistically refuses to accept the new and (ostensibly) immutable circumstances of state limits. [Page 324] RESPONDING GLOBALLY Paradoxically, if we are to save the world from breakdown occasioned by capitalism, we must once again save the capitalists from their global excesses, just as the earlier creation of national welfare states saved the capitalists from their excesses at the national level. The same logic that propelled the creation of the welfare state and the extension of democracy at the national level, now must be extended to the global level, not with the express purpose of making the world safe for capitalism, although that may be the effect, but rather to make the world safe: safe for the common person, safe for civil rights, safe for our children and grandchildren, safe for the flora and fauna. A welfare state, whether national or global, requires a structure of government to shape the programs, to finance them, and to respond to changed circumstances. The difficulty which confronts us in our current situation is that our ability to act at the global level is severely restricted by an institutional framework with limited responsiveness, owing to the recalcitrance of major powers. We are limited as well by our misperception that trying to solve problems at the national level is wholly appropriate for most issues. Our tacit or overt acceptance of functional globalism, of the sort proposed by Daniel Mitrany (1943), that pretends that most issues of global significance are purely technical and best left to experts represents another major limit. In fact, few problems are purely technical. Wherever there is a human dimension to a decision, discretion and preferences enter into play; we leave the realm of the exact and enter the realm of the political. To capitulate to the claims that only the experts can decide, for example, as in the current conventional wisdom regarding independence of central banks (Eijffinger and De Haan 1996; Gormley and De Haan 1996) and the IMF, is to concede to a select group sovereign rights, which few of the world's remaining monarchs even exercise. Political problems require political solutions within a context where a range of opinions can be heard. Those which are global problems require global political solutions. [Page 325] The idea of global government is hardly new. To give but a sample, we can trace the idea back to Immanuel Kant (1796), John Hobson (1915), Leonard Woolf (1916), and Harold Laski (1921). In 1925 Laski was already arguing that world government was one of the implications of modern conditions and that federalism would be the most appropriate form. (Long 1993: 365) Democratic global federalism is also an idea that has been around for awhile. At the time that official representatives in San Francisco in October 1945 were but a few days away from signing the United Nations charter, The New York Times carried a front page account of a conference in Dublin, New Hampshire whose distinguished delegates signed a declaration calling instead for global democratic federalism. (New York Times, October 17, 1945, p. 1) World Federalists have long been active in Canada and published a periodical (World Federalism) espousing the idea between at least 1955 and 1974. W. Warren Wagar dismissed federalism and world federalism one-quarter century ago: the former as "so much cold mutton in the second half of the twentieth [century]"; the latter as a project that feeds "on a wide assortment of deadly illusions", yet whose followers were regarded as so harmless (at the time) that "governments let them continue unmolested and unnoticed." (Wagar 1971: 32-36) Is there reason to believe that federalist structures offer any promise today in dealing with our problems? Federalism within nations has been given an impetus by the neo-liberal emphasis on the downsizing of the state and its associated reallocation of functions from the center to the regions. Supra-national federalism within the European Union (EU) has found strong support in regions, like Catalonia, whose relations with their national capitals have been marked historically by tensions. In a fanciful scenario Wagar suggests that a world state -- the Commonwealth -- might emerge through the voluntary association of a growing number of states with "World Party" governments. He admits that he currently sees no inkling of a World Party on the political horizon. (Wagar 1996: 10-15) Is it any more far-fetched to imagine that the once 6 member European Common Market, now 15 member European Union, which already has over a dozen willing adherents at its doorstep [2], might eventually through a continuous process of expansion and structural modification include all of the world's people and come to be "known simply" as the Union, with the Union Parliament representing the people of the various members, as does the EU Parliament today, and not their national governments? [Page 326] What is new today is the urgency and the possibility for bringing the project into being. Consider the logistics of bringing together the American Founding Fathers in Philadelphia in 1776 or the Fathers of Canadian Confederation in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island in 1867. Even bringing delegates to San Francisco in 1945 was a major undertaking. To physically convene today a representative cross section of the human population would be child's play compared to these earlier assemblies. Logistics is obviously not the issue; the issue is always one of will, which would appear to be growing daily with our expanding sense of the global interdependence of a host of urgent issues. We have already witnessed several instances of the gathering of appreciable numbers of citizen delegates at unofficial meetings that have paralleled major world summits, including some 30,000 women, representing 2,000 NGOs at the Women's Forum which paralleled the September 1995 Beijing United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women. The elaboration of numerous alternative treaties at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and Development -- the Earth Summit -- by the International Forum of NGOs and Social Movements (Foro Internacional 1993) is but one additional indication that the time may have arrived for the people of the world to take bolder action to wrest control of global processes from les nouveaux maitres du monde. NGO representation, both official and unofficial, at world summits has the potential to transform politics; to create a global politics where the people have voice to complement international fora where only states have voice. Preoccupations with the possibility of devastating war and the escalating costs of deterrence, with the attendant neglect of social needs, also focus attention on global institution building to maintain and extend world peace. World Systems theorists who have studied Kondratieff long economic cycles (K-Waves) have been struck by the persistently recurring interaction between war and economic growth processes. (Goldstein 1988) Chase-Dunn and Podobnik see the current K-Wave leading to a 50-50 likelihood of a core war in the 2020s decade and urge us to continue laboring to avoid that eventuality (1995: 32) George Modelski and William R. Thompson wonder whether the current nineteenth K-Wave might avoid an associated global war given, inter alia, "denationalized industrial production, increased political management capacities on the part of international organizations, and the continuing diffusion of democratic institutions." (1996: 225) Their message is a clear one: there is continuing effort to be made if war is to be avoided. However, as Wagar reminds us, peace, like happiness, is a by-product; it is the creation of a "new world civilization" that is the work at hand. (1971: 36) [Page 327] Returning to the factors identified by Chase-Dunn and Podobnik as either exacerbating or mitigating the likelihood of a major war; inequality, international economic integration, international political integration and disarmament (1995: 13) are all areas where substituting the voice of global citizens for the voice of national interests might well move us forward. As Immanuel Wallerstein puts it: "Perhaps we should tiptoe into an uncertain future, trying merely to remember in which direction we are going." (1991: 229). To build a global federal structure may be our best guarantee to assure that we can preserve that which is of value that is close to us and to permit the directional shifts perceived to be necessary when we appear to be veering off course. If we achieve global democratic federalism, the eventual form will reflect the outcome of lengthy political processes, with variations from one level of the hierarchy to another and from one jurisdiction to another at the same level. There is no reason to believe that existing differences in federal structures between countries will disappear, nor any way to predict what form will emerge at the global level. We might see a greatly strengthened United Nations, but this is unlikely to help us much with our dilemmas born of neo-liberalism, unless there is a major sea change in the visions of national governments. A People's Assembly that would provide the UN with a bicameral legislative structure might well be a possible scenario. Citizen involvement and a global assembly of representatives of the world's people could be an important counter weight to a system where states have the sole voice. (Heinrich 1992; Held 1995: 278-83; Wagar 1996) For as Claude Julien reminds us: "States don't have friends; they have interests." (1996: 16) For Canadians, envisioning forms for global federal structures should come as naturally as getting out of bed in the morning. Let us not be timid about global government. I subscribe in principle to the notion of subsidiarity, but what has been called marble cake federalism is more likely to be the working result. Responsibilities may rest at a particular level, but higher levels do not keep silent when problems arise. Similarly, pressures may also go from a lower level to a higher level as new tensions emerge. The point of democratic institutions is precisely not to freeze important elements of the structure of governance indefinitely because of the de facto or de jure veto of a key player. [Page 328] THE CENTRALITY OF CITIZENS The phrase democratic deficit is used with frequency in the context of European integration to focus attention on the relative exclusion of the people from the shaping of a united European. (Fischer 1995: 203-222; Norton 1996: 177-93) Those who speak of a democratic deficit seek to provide Europeans with both responsibilities and an effective voice in the conduct of the affairs of the Union. However important the right to a European passport and free movement within the Union may be, a Europe of the people depends on the individual exercise of collective responsibilities with one's counterparts in other European countries. This is one of the messages that has appeared in a series of monthly articles on European citizenship ("Une Europe des Citoyens") between March and June 1996 in Le Monde Diplomatique. Articles in the May issue by Pierre Behar (1996) and Paul Thibaud (1996) support a federal Europe in which citizens play an important role and both refer to that as having been the vision of General de Gaulle. Drainville has raised important questions about "construction of citizenship in the world economy", suggesting that in fact citizens are presently banished from the space of the world economy. (1995: 71) As Drainville observes, "there is something radically important about conceptualizing the world economy as a social space in the making." (1995: 70) The very act of describing serves to alter; the act of naming can create. To see our current situation as one of exclusionary global governance is to raise the possibility of action. Drainville speaks of reconstructing, reimagining and remapping world politics. (1995: 70) That is precisely the task: to create a real "world politics" which would give substance to a phrase that has long been a misnomer. What we label today as world politics is in fact the realm of anti-politics (Ferguson 1990; Mulgan 1994), of the experts and of the diplomats whose instructions carefully delineate their limits. The NGOs represents an ongoing important stepping stone in the broadening of world politics and in the construction of world citizenship. Their achievements should renew our hope that what appear to be oppressive and unchanging structures are in reality processes in motion and strengthen our resolve to continue our collective efforts. [Page 329] Those who reject supranational government as escapism would appear to be affirming that citizen participation is a well-established reality in most of the world's democracies and that citizens acting through their governments are equal to the task at hand. In fact, democratic deficits are ubiquitous and have been growing with the advance of neo-liberalism. To the best of my knowledge democratic deficits are not measured, not reported, and not the object of serious criticism in the way that government budget deficits are. Indeed were national democratic deficits to be reduced markedly, the hysteria concerning fiscal deficits and the size of the state might well be dispelled as an outcome of the resulting public debates. It is not only regional citizens and world citizens that are to be created, but true national and local citizens must also be either created or recreated. Mitrany suggested that "the performance of a number of common functions is the way to create a normal community." (Mitrany in Long 1993: 371) For too long now we have been witnessing the disappearance of common functions. Our challenge today is to create a world in which the number of common functions performed by individuals is markedly expanded in order to swell the ranks of the politically active at all levels. The task confronting the peoples of the world is the major one of changing perceptions of the nature of our current reality and then changing behavior to join in and create a public debate at all levels and to engage in political action: that is the new world civilization and it is already in formation. Nor is the "Academy" being left in the dust: a keyword search of the on-line public access catalogue of any major university library will identify an outpouring of new publications dealing with either global governance or democracy, far too numerous to list here. Civil society must either be created or strengthened everywhere. The democratic deficit is partly of our own making in so far as we have ceased to behave collectively. Our myopia, cynicism, withdrawal, avoidance of collective responsibility, and deference to authority and technical experts have been carefully nurtured by an educational system in the service of nationalism. We often hear attributed to H.G. Wells a phrase relating to the race between education and catastrophe. In fact, where Wells' sentiment appears in context, we find that he addresses the evils of nationalism and of education distorted by those who choose to use nationalism for personal advantage. (Wells 1932: 650) Most of us are products of an educational system that has done its best through passive learning to neutralize knowledge and of a society with an anti-political bent. That many of us are, nonetheless, active and political is a tribute to the resilience of the human spirit of justice and gives yet additional cause for hope. Moreover, even in the classroom, professing is increasingly giving way to facilitating. The spreading emphasis on participation leaves few of us unchanged. [Page 330] The construction of meaningful world citizenship is not likely to be a direct by-product of "globalization from above." Indeed, meaningful citizenship at whatever level is unlikely to result from the activities of the ne buleuse, which tend not to focus on participatory democracy, but rather on "good governance", which is something said to be expressed by a ratio of government expenditure to gross product. The construction of meaningful world citizenship is taking place daily. "Globalization from below" with its daily cross-border, cross-cultural interactions, is the incessant process by which our mental images are being altered. Conscious perceptions may not matter in the early stages of formation of our sense of planet-wide interdependence. The process is in motion and the participants may only be dimly aware of the transition of which they are currently part. We have yet to recognize the opportunities that are arising daily. There are limits to the role of civil society at all levels, especially at the transnational or global level, but the frontier of action is an ever-changing one. In an era of positive-feedback, particularly nourished by electronic communications, those limits can change swiftly; witness the events following Perestroika and, less than five years later, the fall of the Berlin Wall. To get from here to there will require major efforts to spread the word: we live on one small planet and we are one people with a common culture. We may speak different languages, we may have distinct local customs, we may look different, but we are one. Those of us committed to saving local autonomy, must support efforts to strengthen the global umbrella. Elise Boulding (1988) has written of crafting a global civil society. The time has come to craft as well the global democratic federal structures of governance to go with that. If individuals become citizens instead of onlookers, then the prospect of the public and the political spaces becoming far more active venues could well mean the death of expert-driven exclusionary anti-politics where decisions currently masquerade as technical necessities. [Page 331] CONCLUSION I think it appropriate to note that I wholeheartedly support the idea of global taxation and redistribution, essential elements for reducing inequality. (Frankman 1996) Nonetheless, I reject the global tax proposal which seems to have achieved the most popularity of late, the Tobin Tax of up to 0.5% of the value of each foreign exchange transaction, insofar as it deals with effects and not causes. Tobin's original intent was not to raise revenue, but to "throw sand in the wheels of international finance". By 1995 foreign exchange transactions were estimated to exceed US$1.2 trillion per day. This hypermobility of capital represents a veritable sword of Damocles perceived to threaten any government contemplating measures that diverge from the current market conception of proper public sector behavior. (Haq, Kaul and Grunberg 1996). I favor instead the creation of a single world currency with appropriate supporting institutions, which, incidentally, is James Tobin's preferred scenario: according to Tobin the best solution would be "a common currency, common monetary and fiscal policy, and economic integration." (Tobin 1978: 154). The "freedom" to devalue that a separate currency accords to a nation offers no guarantee that generalized benefits will be realized. (Bourgignon, de Melo & Morrisson, 1991) Insofar as exchange rates play a key role in the frantic quest for national competitiveness, international economic integration that brings their elimination, if accompanied where necessary by appropriate offsets, further reduces the likelihood of war. One ingredient is not made explicit in Tobin's list: global democratic institutions that presumably would shape a fiscal policy to meet the needs of disadvantaged individuals and regions wherever they may be, just as national institutions presently serve that function with varying degrees of success. My own work on the global economy has brought me to cross the line from the technical to the political. Institutions intended to achieve global social justice must be embedded in a global political system where the peoples of the world can give expression to their will in a democratic context. The political awareness that is necessary to rescue the state, currently under both strain and merciless attack, is the very same awareness that is necessary to construct political democracy at all levels of the hierarchy. What is needed is not a blind allegiance to the Father Land or the Mother Country, right or wrong, but an appreciation of the shifting limits of sovereignty and of the ever-shifting locus for action in distinct problem areas. [Page 332] Political awakening associated with a local issue may be the start of a long march toward support for global government, given the clear line of causation from supposed inevitabilities at the local level to power relationships extending to the global scale. To the extent that the fallout of neo-liberal economic policy reawakens collective action, the next round may well feature a broadened focus, extending from the local to the global, in recognition of our interdependence and the common problems we confront around the world, whose resolution lies beyond local jurisdiction. That common perception is the current reality of the many NGO members who network regularly with counterparts in many countries of the world. In the very first paper that I presented on global taxation in 1970, I closed with the following quote from Bertrand Russell: "It is not by pacifist sentiment, but by world-wide economic organization, that civilized mankind is to be saved from collective suicide." (Russell 1934: 510; Frankman 1971) Today, it is clear to me that Russell specified a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one for avoiding collective suicide. For E.B. White, the sufficient condition was unambiguous: "Peace is the product of responsible government." (White: 41) That ideal must be our continuing objective as educators and citizens if the promise of no global war is to be realized for the 19th and subsequent K-waves. END-NOTES 1. And: "Far from being a sinister occult power, the nébuleuse may turn out to be a Wizard of Oz. Perhaps no one, or no coherent structure, is really in control." For Cox, Le Monde Diplomatique's phrase "conjures up a coherent strategy of dominance, virtually a conspiracy." (Cox 1996: E-Mail) 2. Eurobarometer sampled opinion within the EU countries as to the willingness in 1995 of respondents to see each of 24 European countries join the Union in the future. Spanish respondents were the most generally favorable to expansion in that they were amenable to admitting most of the countries; their lowest score was 44% in favor of admitting Latvia. (1996: B62-63) [Page 333] REFERENCES Behar, Pierre (1996). "Repenser le couple franco-allemand." Le Monde Diplomatique 43 (May), 4-5. Boulding, Elise ( 1988). Building A Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World. New York: Columbia University, Teachers College Press. Bourgignon, F., J. De Melo, & C. Morrisson (1991). "Poverty and Income Distribution During Adjustment: Issues and Evidence from the OECD Project." World Development 19 (Nov.), 1485-1508. Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Bruce Podobnik (1995). "The Next World War: World-System Cycles and Trends." Journal of World-Systems Research 1 (no. 6). 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