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Volume 3, Number 2 (Spring 1997) Book ReviewPacific Asia Resource Center. THE PEOPLE VS. GLOBAL CAPITAL: THE G-7, TNCs, SAPs, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. Report of the International People's Tribunal to Judge the G-7, Tokyo, July 1993. New York: The Apex Press, 1994. vii + 163 pp. ISBN 0-945257-23-6 $14.95 (paper). Reviewed by Jan L. Flora, Department of Sociology, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, USA The International People's Tribunal to Judge the G-7 was convened in Tokyo in 1993 to coincide with the G-7 meetings also held in Tokyo. The G-7 group consists of the Finance Ministers and Heads of State of Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Its focus is the world economy, although other urgent items are discussed. The Tribunal was initiated in 1992 at a Washington meeting of 100 NGO activists. It is affiliated with the Rome-based Permanent People's Tribunal. The Tribunal to Judge the G-7 gathered evidence and, utilizing international law such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, judged the G-7's "complicity" in the present global capitalist economic system, and in particular the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), enforced through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This little book contains testimony of individuals from Japan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sudan, Jamaica, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Brazil affiliated with universities, independent research institutes and other NGOs. It contains an eloquent statement from a farmer from Japan. It concludes with a document of indictment, which summarizes the case against the G-7 in straightforward language. Testimonies cover The testimonies are uneven. Some are excellent and well documented. Others critique the capitalist development process generally and at least one (Budiman) presents a list of major debtor countries suggesting that Indonesia ranks second only to India in total international indebtedness. The table does not list either Brazil or Mexico, both of which have larger debts than Indonesia. SAPs are agreed to by the debtor country as a condition for receiving a SAL (Structural Adjustment Loan) from the IMF. Generally, other lending is keyed on approval of the SAL and acceptable progress toward fulfilling the SAP. The SAPs generally contain specifics for accomplishing the following: reduction of the size of the government and the fiscal deficit, privatization of particular government enterprises, liberalization of foreign investment, and "getting prices right" including currency devaluation, substantial tariff and domestic subsidy reduction. [Page 356] While presenters agree that the import-substitution statist approaches previously pursued by many Third World governments had ultimately failed the masses. However, they argue, the SAPs were designed above all else to ensure that transnational corporations (TNCs) could operate freely throughout the Third World. While ostensibly designed to encourage more efficient production and delivery of services in debtor countries, citizens in those countries was not served by the SAPs^×neither in the short nor the longer term. Presenters at the Tribunal suggest the following reasons: 1) The SAPs result in debtor countries "eating their seed corn." Investments in human capital (including both educational and health services) and infrastructure have been curtailed sharply in many countries in order to shrink government. Jennifer Jones, a Jamaican NGO leader, shows that the percentage of the Jamaican national budget represented by the Ministries of Construction (Roads and Housing), Public Utilities and Transport, Agriculture, and Youth and Community Development, and Local Government declined by from half to 70% from the 1970s to the 1990s. Per capita expenditures for education and for health declined by about 1/5. Only the percentages for the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Finance grew. The latter, which manages and pays the national external debt, represented over half the total budget by the early 1990s. 2) Isagani Serrano, Vice President of the Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement, points out that "getting the prices right" is a good deal more complicated, because of externalities, than is suggested by the free marketers. He points out, "Structural adjustment was just as environmentally blind as the previous State-dominated structures that it was trying to undo" (p. 109), and argues that cutting back spending "undermined the government's capacity for environmental management" (p. 114). He also admits that South Korea cut down 1/3 of its forests while pursuing a successful state-led Export Oriented Industrialization. One might conclude that the culprit with respect to environmental degradation may be economic growth, but the SAPs offer no solution. More broadly, if the SAPs ultimately serve the interests of the TNCs at the expense of the people in debtor countries, then one would not expect the internalization of externalities^×whether they be deteriorating infrastructure, human capital erosion, or environmental degradation^×in "getting the prices right." [Page 357] 3) Maria Clara Couto Soares of IBASE, the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis, in the best essay in the book, analyzes the process of debt repayment and assesses the impact of the SAPs in that country. She points out that the foreign debt by 1985 was US$105 billion, up 64% over 1980, in spite of the fact that Brazil paid US$91 billion in foreign debt service in that period. In order to make payments on the external debt, the government (lacking a fiscal surplus), issued bonds to purchase hard currency from exporters. This increased the Brazilian government's domestic debt and triggered inflation. Efforts to dampen that inflation brought recession. Annual GDP growth was 1.7% in the 1980s^×less than the population growth rate. Poverty grew more than 50% over the decade. And by 1989, Brazil's debt had actually grown to $115 billion. Two sectors in Brazil did quite well--exporters and the financial sector, who were able to make considerable sums through speculation. By the 1990s, Brazil had the greatest income inequality of any country in the world. Soares concludes by saying that structural adjustment and its neo-liberal policies have not provided a base for new development, but rather have eroded the previously developed productive and institutional structure and technological capabilities. 4) The Tribunal's "Indictment" does a good job of discussing the relationships which have weakened the ability of indebted Third World countries to provide for their people: The G-7 desires to remain dominant through the "constant expansion of global capital" (p. 126). However, the global expansion of capital reduces the power of the G-7 nations, as they have become "front men for global capital" (p. 127). The World Bank is also a servant to the TNCs rather than "serving the common good," as was the GATT (now the World Trade Organization--WTO). Indictments include violation of Articles 23, 26, and 25, which forbid denial of the right to work, the right to education and the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well being; usurpation of the sovereignty guaranteed member states in the UN Charter through the imposition of SAPs via secret negotiations and rulings by the IMF and World Bank; etc. These violations are presented in more detail in an introductory essay by Richard Falk, international legal scholar. While the indictments are well argued, the call to action may be satisfying to those who made it, but not very realistic politically. Organized citizen groups are exhorted to demand compensation from the responsible institutions to those who were harmed by SAPs, and to obtain recognition by G-7 leaders of their of personal responsibility for the suffering that structural adjustment has caused. Based on a secret analysis by the IMF of 66 SAPs which apparently shows almost a total failure to achieve their fiscal, monetary, income growth, and debt reduction objectives, the Tribunal suggests that the IMF be required to compensate "SAPped" countries through debt reduction for the harm done by SAPs to people and that the World Bank compensate persons harmed by its failed projects. [Page 358] While these are interesting ideas, I would have been more satisfied if there had also been analysis of possible contradictions in the system and of the circumstances under which the G-7, the World Bank, or others might be persuaded to counter the power of the TNCs. Perhaps, with organized citizen pressure, issues like global warming could become a cause for which the G-7 countries, in their own self interest, would discard free market concepts and provide grants to Third World countries and to their farmers, indigenous peoples, and others to encourage for reducing pollution reduction and rain forest conservation. At what point, given the increased capacity and pressure for the World Bank to evaluate projects it supports, will the World Bank conclude that the principles behind the SAPs^×and eventually the globalizing development model which underlies the SAPs--must be radically altered? There are efforts within the Bank to change the corporate culture from an engineering mentality to one which gives greater importance to social results. How successful those efforts will be is unclear, and may depend also on citizen pressure for internalizing the externalities generated by the TNCs. Only once in this book are the NGO coalitions mentioned which have grown up around the major UN Conferences of the past decade on women, the environment, food security, etc. How might they contribute to such citizen pressure? This book is aimed at activists, and is written in straightforward prose. It is also appropriate as a textbook in advanced undergraduate courses as well as graduate courses on international development and related topics. At the graduate level it should be supplemented by other readings on Globalization. I expect to assign the four chapters I cited above in the introductory part of my graduate rural development course. Although the "Indictment" chapter has shortcomings, it should generate a healthy discussion on the relationship among actors in the Globalization process and regarding appropriate tactics for diminishing or reorienting the global power of TNCs. [Page 359] v. 7/29/97 |
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